School Finance, Race, and Reparations by Green, Preston C, III et al.
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 
Volume 27 Issue 2 Article 7 
Spring 2021 
School Finance, Race, and Reparations 
Preston C. Green III 
University of Connecticut, preston.green@uconn.edu 
Bruce D. Baker 
Rutgers University, bruce.baker@gse.rutgers.edu 
Joseph O. Oluwole 
Montclair State University, oluwolej@montclair.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Higher Education Commons, Human Rights Law 
Commons, and the Law and Race Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Preston C. Green III, Bruce D. Baker, and Joseph O. Oluwole, School Finance, Race, and Reparations, 27 
Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 483 (2021). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol27/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee 




School Finance, Race, and Reparations 
Preston C. Green III*, Bruce D. Baker**, Joseph O. Oluwole*** 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction ............................................................................... 484 
 
II. Part I:  Separate-But-Equal Era ............................................ 486 
 
III. Part II:  Black-White School Funding Disparities in the 
Aftermath of Brown ..................................................................... 490 
A. Property Taxes ...................................................................... 491 
B. Insufficient General State Aid ............................................. 494 
C. Stealth Inequalities .............................................................. 495 
 
IV. Part III:  School Desegregation Litigation ............................ 496 
A. Hobson v. Hansen ................................................................. 497 
B. Milliken v. Bradley ............................................................... 500 
 
V. Part IV:  School Finance Litigation ........................................ 504 
A. Alabama:  Lynch v. Alabama ............................................... 506 
B. Kansas:  Montoy v. Kansas .................................................. 507 
C. Mississippi:  Williams v. Reeves .......................................... 511 
D. New Mexico:  Martinez v. New Mexico ................................ 512 
E. North Carolina:  Silver v. Halifax County Board of 
Commissioners .......................................................................... 516 
 
VI. Part V:  Reparations Framework for State Legislation ....... 519 
A. Four-Part Reparations Framework ..................................... 523 
 
 * John & Maria Neag Professor of Urban Education, Professor of 
Educational Leadership and Law, University of Connecticut. On the behalf of my 
co-authors, I thank Idun Green for her editing and patience as we worked on this 
project. 
 ** Professor of Educational Theory, Policy, & Administration, Rutgers 
University. 
 *** Professor of Educational Leadership, Montclair State University.  
484 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 483 (2021) 
B. Examples ............................................................................... 529 
1. Lost Property Tax Revenues Due to Depressed Values .. 529 
2. Inequitable Taxation in the Form of Higher Tax Rates 
Adopted to Offset Revenue Losses ........................................ 531 
3. School Finance Policies Which Capitalize on and/or 
Reinforce Historical Disparities ............................................ 534 
4. Increased Costs of Achieving Common Outcome Goals for 
Children in the Presence of Racial Isolation ........................ 536 
C. Equal Protection Clause Challenges ................................... 539 
 
VII. Part VI:  Federal Role ........................................................... 542 
A. Legislation to Remediate Black-White School Funding Gaps
 .................................................................................................... 550 
B. Legislation Providing Additional Funding for School 
Districts Experiencing Black Racial Isolation ......................... 553 
C. Department of Education Enforcement Action Pursuant to 
Title VI’s Implementing Regulations ....................................... 554 
 
VIII. Conclusion ............................................................................ 557 
I. Introduction 
Black Americans are suffering from the effects of slavery, Jim 
Crow, and other forms of discrimination that continue to the 
present day.1 This negative treatment has impacted, inter alia, 
 
 1. See generally, Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Why Reparations to African American 
Descendants in the United States Are Essential to Democracy, 14 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 633, 635 (2011); Michael F. Bivens, Restorative Justice, Slavery, and the 
American Soul, A Policy-Oriented Intercultural Human Rights Approach to the 
Question of Reparations, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 254–55 (2006); Kyle D. 
Logue, Reparations as Redistribution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1319, 1323 (2004); Carleton 
Waterhouse, Total Recall:  Restoring the Public Memory of Enslaves 
African-Americans and the American System of Slavery through Rectificatory 
Justice and Reparations, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 703, 723 (2011); Eric Y. 
Yamamoto, Racial Reparations:  Japanese American Redress and African 
American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 502 (1998).  
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their financial status,2 their health,3 housing,4 and their 
educational attainment.5 To remedy this harm, scholars, activists, 
and politicians have called for reparations.6 William Darrity and 
Kristen Mullen define reparations as “a program of 
acknowledgment, redress, and closure of a grievance injustice,” 
which in the case of Blacks “include[s] slavery, legal segregation 
(Jim Crow), and ongoing discrimination and stigmatization.”7 
Acknowledgment refers to “a formal apology and a 
commitment for redress on the part of the American people as a 
whole.”8 Redress—which can be in the form of restitution—refers 
to the “restoration of survivors to their condition before the 
injustice occurred or to a condition they might have attained had 
the injustice not taken place.”9 Finally, “[c]losure involves mutual 
conciliation between African Americans, the beneficiaries of 
slavery, legal segregation, and ongoing discrimination toward 
[B]lacks.”10 
With respect to restitution, Darrity and Mullen elaborate:  
“Specifically, restitution for African Americans would eliminate 
racial disparities in wealth, income, education, health, sentencing 
and incarceration, political participation, and subsequent 
opportunities to engage in American political and social life.”11 As 
this quote illustrates, addressing educational disparities is a key 
component of a reparations program. A key cause of Black-white 
 
 2. See, e.g., Ronald Clifford, Note, The African American Family v. The 
United States: A Template for the Lawsuit of Just Compensation, 5 WHITTIER J. 
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 603, 619 (2006); A. Mechele Dickerson, Designing Slavery 
Reparations:  Lessons from Complex Litigation, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1278–79 
(2020). 
 3. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 2, at 1271–74; Kevin Outterson, Tragedy 
and Remedy:  Reparations for Disparities in Black Health, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 735 (2005).  
 4. Jonathan Kaplan & Andrew Valls, Housing Discrimination as a Basis 
for Black Reparations, 3 PUB. AFF. Q. 255 (2007).  
 5. ROY L. BROOKS, A NEW MODEL FOR REPARATIONS 36–97 (2004).  
 6. See supra notes 1–5 for citations.  
 7. WILLIAM A. DARRITY & KIRSTEN MULLEN, FROM HERE TO EQUALITY, 
REPARATIONS FOR BLACK AMERICANS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 11 (2020).  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 12.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. (emphasis added).  
486 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 483 (2021) 
educational disparities is school funding.12 Black-white funding 
disparities were a hallmark of the separate-but-equal era.13 These 
disparities endured after Brown v. Board of Education and 
continue into the present time.14 Consequently, schools in 
predominantly Black communities are less able to provide an 
education to meet the needs of their students.15 
In this article, we explain why and how school finance reform 
should be a part of a reparations program for Black Americans. 
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I explains how Black-white 
school funding disparities occurred during the separate-but-equal 
era. Part II discusses how these funding disparities have occurred 
in the aftermath of the Brown decision. Parts III and IV explore 
why school desegregation and school finance litigation, 
respectively, have failed to remedy these gaps. Part V lays out a 
reparations framework that state legislatures could adopt to 
provide restitution to schools and taxpayers harmed by state 
policies creating Black-white racial funding disparities. Part VI 
discusses the role that the federal government could play in a 
school finance reparations program.  
II. Part I:  Separate-But-Equal Era 
According to economist Robert Margo, during the 
separate-but-equal era, “([B]lack-to-white) per pupil expenditures 
in southern public schools followed a U-shaped pattern over time:  
[A]n initial period of relative similarity in the late nineteenth 
century, followed by a pronounced shift toward inequality around 
 
 12. Preston C. Green III, Bruce D. Baker, & Joseph Oluwole, Achieving 
Racial Equal Educational Opportunity through School Finance Litigation, 4 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 283, 286 (2008) (stating that research studies show a 
correlation between funding and educational outcomes for minority students).  
 13. See ROBERT A. MARGO, RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE SOUTH, 1880–1950:  
AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 6–33 (1990) (describing how funding disparities contribute 
to low socioeconomic status for American Blacks). 
 14. See Nonwhite School Districts Get $23 Billion Less Than White Districts 
Despite Serving the Same Number of Students, EDBUILD (Feb. 2019), 
https://edbuild.org/content/23-billion (explaining that gerrymandering school 
district boundaries divides communities racially and economically) 
[perma.cc/2CU4-38CV].  
 15. See Green et al., supra note 12, 308–11 (stating the correlation between 
lack of funding and poor educational outcomes).  
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the turn of the century that persisted for forty years, and then a 
trend toward equalization in the 1940s.”16 Black 
disenfranchisement and white demand for better schools caused 
this initial decline in relative funding equality.17 Black 
disenfranchisement enabled Southern middle-class and wealthy 
whites to accept local property taxation because they did not have 
to fund Black schools.18 Using a different scheme, poor whites, who 
lived in counties with large Black populations relied on state aid 
rather than local property taxes to finance better schools.19 
Counties would divert a disproportionate amount of funding of 
state aid, which was distributed based on total school aid 
population, to white schools.20 
Margo cited a 1917 U.S. Bureau of Education report titled 
“Negro Education:  A Study of the Private and High Schools for 
Colored People in the United States” to illustrate the huge funding 
and resource discrepancies between Black and white schools.21 
According to the report, “[f]or every dollar spent on teacher salaries 
per white child ages 6 to 14, 29 cents was spent per [B]lack child.”22 
Because of this discrepancy in teacher salaries, Black schools 
experienced “a shorter school year, [and] classroom overcrowding 
(a higher teacher-pupil ratio).”23 This report also documented 
shocking discrepancies in facilities and instructional materials:  
Many of the [B]lack schools were in privately owned buildings 
(churches, lodges, or rural cabins) donated to local school boards 
 
 16. MARGO, supra note 13, at 33.  
 17. See id. at 36. (“Growing demand and the concomitant institutional 
changes, which were coincident with disenfranchisement, led to increases in 
school budgets, frequently through the levying of local school property taxes.”). 
 18. See id. (“Wealthy white landlords argued against local school taxes 
because they themselves bore, or so they believed, most of the cost and personally 
received few benefits.”). 
 19. See id. (“[M]any middle-class white parents . . . were opposed to higher 
school taxes because they, as a group, owned much more taxable wealth than 
blacks[.]”). 
 20. See id. at 37 (“State school funds were typically allocated to counties on 
the basis of the total school age population (or enrollment or attendance) in the 
county; the funds were distributed to district school boards which had 
considerable discretion in how to spend the money.”).  
 21. Id. at 18.  
 22. Id. at 19.  
 23. Id.  
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and pressed into service. The exterior surroundings “varied 
from untidy to positively filthy. Ash heaps often adorned the 
front yards, . . . at barely respectable distances leaned ugly 
outboxes in unscreened and shameful impudence. . . . School 
equipment (books, blackboards, chalk, maps globes) was 
undersupplied or nonexistent.24 
Black-white school funding discrepancies were most extreme at 
the high school level.25 There were only sixty-four public high 
schools for Black children throughout the South.26 Indeed, “[a] 
southern [B]lack child wishing a post-secondary education had to 
seek it in one of the region’s private high schools or else leave the 
region.”27 “Because most of the private schools were located in 
towns or cities while the [B]lack population was heavily rural,” the 
report further observed, “a [B]lack child’s opportunities for 
secondary education were severely circumscribed.”28 
 Plessy v. Ferguson29 provided the legal support for these 
inequitably funded, racially segregated schools during the 
separate-but-equal era.30 In Plessy, the Court ruled that a 
Louisiana statute that required railroads transporting passengers 
to provide separate-but-equal accommodations for Blacks and 
whites did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.31 The Court 
reasoned that laws mandating racial separation were “within the 
competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police 
power.”32 The Court based its holding on the well-established 
practice of maintaining racially segregated schools, noting that 
“the most common instance” of the acceptable exercise of police 
power “is connected with the establishment of separate schools for 
 
 24. Id. at 19–20.  
 25. Id. at 20 (noting that differences in education between white and Black 
children were most pronounced at the high school level, where black children were 
severely limited by the low number of available public schools and typically had 
to seek out private schools). 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id.  
 29.  See Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (upholding the 
constitutionality of racial segregation).  
 30. See id. (approvingly citing racially segregated schools). 
 31. See id. at 550–51 (finding the segregation of races does not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 32. Id.  
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white and colored children.”33 The Court also could not find the 
Louisiana statute “unreasonable or more obnoxious to the 
fourteenth amendment than the acts of congress requiring 
separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia.”34  
In an 1899 decision, Cumming v. Board of Education of 
Richmond County, Georgia,35 the Court signaled that the mere 
existence of Black schools “was sometimes precarious.”36 In this 
case, a school board closed the high school for Black students while 
maintaining a high school for white students.37 The board allegedly 
made this decision because it had insufficient funds to maintain a 
Black high school in light of the demand for a primary school for 
Black children.38 The Court refused to enjoin the board from 
maintaining the white high school, finding that the closing of the 
Black high school was a permissible exercise of state discretion:  
[W]hile all admit that the benefits and burdens of public 
taxation must be shared by citizens without 
discrimination . . . on account of their race, the education of the 
people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter 
belonging to the respective states, and any interference on the 
part of Federal authority with the management of such schools 
cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and 
unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of 
the land.39 
It was not until the 1940s when the gap narrowed between 
Black and white schools with respect to length of school term, class 
size, and per-pupil expenditures.40 This narrowing was due to legal 
challenges from the NAACP, monitoring of Black schools by the 
federal government, studies of school conditions by Black scholars, 
 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 551.  
 35. See Cumming v. Bd. of Educ. of Richmond Cnty., Georgia 175 U.S. 528, 
545 (1899) (holding that the discontinuation of high school services for Black 
children was constitutional).  
 36. MARGO, supra note 13, at 70.  
 37. See Cumming, 175 U.S. at 544 (laying out the facts of the school board’s 
decision). 
 38. See id. at 544–45 (explaining the school board’s decision on financial 
grounds). 
 39. Id. at 545.  
 40. See MARGO, supra note 13, at 26 (describing the relationship between 
school, race, and labor outcomes).  
490 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 483 (2021) 
and changing public opinion.41 Because of this pressure, the South 
responded “by paying closer attention to the equal part of 
separate-but-equal, fearing the loss of the separate part.”42 
However, it was too late because the NAACP had shifted its 
strategy to target the morality of the separate-but-doctrine.43 This 
change in approach would lead to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
the 1954 Brown decision, which overturned Plessy.44 
III. Part II:  Black-White School Funding Disparities in the 
Aftermath of Brown 
In spite of decades of school and school finance litigation in the 
aftermath of Brown, racial funding disparities still remain to the 
present day.45 A report by the nonprofit group EdBuild found that 
school districts serving predominantly nonwhite students received 
$23 billion less than white districts during the 2015–16 school 
year.46 According to the report, the average nonwhite district 
received $2,226 less than a white school district per student.47 
Racial disparities remain even after controlling for wealth:  
Poor-white school districts still received almost $1,500 more per 
student than their poor-nonwhite counterparts.48 In this part, we 





 41. See id. at 50–51 (“The initial court battles, focusing on desegregation of 
higher education and the elimination of separate wage scales for black and white 
teachers, were fought in the late 1930s and early 1940s[.]”).  
 42. Id. at 51. 
 43. See id. (discussing the NAACP’s strategy shift towards an argument that 
“de jure segregation was morally wrong”). 
 44. See id. (stating that the NAACP’s new focus on the morality of de jure 
segregation found success in Brown v. Board of Education).  
 45. See EDBUILD, supra note 14 (describing funding and racially disparities). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
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A. Property Taxes 
The most obvious source of race-based, particularly 
Black-white disparities in school funding are those that result from 
differences in the taxable property wealth of taxing districts which 
provide revenue for schools serving Black versus those serving 
white students.49 Local public-school districts in many states 
continue to rely heavily on local property taxes to support their 
schools.50 Particularly through the first half of the twentieth 
century, numerous actors including government programs and 
officials as well as private developers engaged in highly 
orchestrated efforts to create and reinforce racially segregated 
housing development.51 Many of these forces persist to this day, 
through practices ranging from discriminatory mortgage lending 
practices to exclusionary zoning.52 The creation of the Federal 
Housing Authority in 1934, increasing the share of a home’s value 
that could be taken on as a mortgage, and the term over which a 
mortgage could be paid significantly increased access to single 
family housing for young buyers.53 But, due to both explicit and 
implicit criteria for accessing these loans, the beneficiaries were 
overwhelmingly white.54 These included risk criteria developed by 
the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) for issuing insured 
loans that invariably classified homes in non-immigrant white 
neighborhoods as the lowest risk and homes in Black 
 
 49. See BRUCE J. BIDDLE & DAVID C. BERLINER, EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP: 
BEYOND INSTRUCTIONAL LEADERSHIP 48–59 (2002) (stating that public school 
funding originates from property taxes).  
 50. See id. (“Nearly half of the funding for public schools in the United 
States, however, is provided through local taxes, generating large differences in 
funding between wealthy and impoverished communities[.]”). 
 51. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW:  A FORGOTTEN 
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).  
 52. See Kaplan & Valls, supra note 4, at 255 (“An important part of the story 
of racial inequality today is the history of housing and lending discrimination in 
the second half of the twentieth century.”). 
 53. See id at 261 (“[A]lmost all of the growth in home-ownership between 
1920 (46 percent) and 1960 (62 percent) came from under-60 buyers.”). 
 54. See id. (“[B]oth explicit and implicit racial preferences built into the FHA 
loan system meant that the beneficiaries of FHA-insured loans were 
overwhelmingly White, and Black Americans had little opportunity to purchase 
homes on an equal footing with White Americans.”).  
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neighborhoods as high risk and often ineligible for insured loans.55 
The expansion of access to homeownership, through both FHA and 
Veterans Administration (VA) backed loans became a primary 
path to building family wealth in the post WWII period, but due to 
restrictions in access to these loans, Blacks were largely excluded 
from this opportunity.56 
In many cases, zones were relegated to Black homeownership 
based on established school boundaries, while in others, school 
district boundaries were redrawn (and redrawn) around Black or 
white neighborhoods to reinforce segregation.57 Special legislation 
was passed in Missouri in 2006 permitting the remaining 
predominantly white northeastern corner of Kansas City, Missouri 
to unilaterally annex itself from the Black city district to its mostly 
white neighbor.58 The organization of school district taxing 
jurisdictions across states remains a complicated patchwork, 
wherein race and racial segregation continue to play a significant 
role.59 Most intensely segregated across taxing jurisdictions are 
Northeastern and Great Lakes area metropolitan areas where 
each highly segregated suburban enclave tends to act as its own 
school taxing jurisdiction.60 In New England states, the town or 
municipality serves as the fiscal steward of the school district, 
more closely aligning governance of zoning policy with governance 
of schools.61 Southern states operate mostly county-based systems, 
where counties in the aggregate tend to be more racially diverse 
 
 55. See id. at 262 (discussing the impact of a low insurance rating on the 
ability to receive an insured loan). 
 56. See id. (noting that the loans available to military veterans “largely 
excluded homes in urban areas, and favored new homes in the suburbs” which 
tended not to benefit African Americans). 
 57. See Kevin Gotham, Missed Opportunities, Enduring Legacies: School 
Segregation and Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, AM. STUD. 5–10 (2002) 
(stating that gerrymandering contributes to racial segregation). 
 58. See Elle Moxley, The Data Shows Kansas City’s School System Is 
Complicated, Segregated and Inefficient, KCUR (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.kcur.org/education/2019-05-09/the-data-shows-kansas-citys-school-
system-is-complicated-segregated-and-inefficient (“By 2017, 78 percent of schools 
in the system were segregated–25 district schools and 30 charter schools.”) 
[perma.cc/UK2E-8F88]. 
 59. See id. (quoting various national experts on the similarity of problems 
facing the district to nationwide issue). 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
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than the cities and towns within them.62 While this organizational 
feature should theoretically mitigate racial disparities, on the one 
hand, it allows the disparities to simply be hidden within counties, 
and on the other hand, southern states created separate 
independent, segregated city districts carved from their county 
hosts. 
It is important to understand, however, that tax bases from 
which local revenue for schools is derived do not exist exclusively 
of residential property, nor is most of the variation in wealth from 
one to another taxing jurisdiction driven by variation in residential 
property values.63 A significant share of local property tax bases 
includes commercial, industrial, utility and other non-residential 
properties.64 Sometimes, high value properties are otherwise 
undesirable to have in your back yard—such as an oil refinery or 
other industrial facility—and thus we find these properties in the 
back yards of low value residential properties relegated for 
minority homeownership.65 The presence and uneven distribution 
of these taxable assets often complicates analysis of the 
intersection between race, taxable wealth and school revenues.66 
This specific problem undermined establishing residents of school 
districts with weak tax bases as a suspect classification in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,67 where 
evidence was provided that significant shares of low-income 
families resided in districts with relatively high taxable property 
wealth. 
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the poorest families are 
 
 62. See Kendra Taylor, Erica Frankenberg, & Genevieve Siegal-Hawley, 
Racial Segregation in the Southern Schools, School Districts, and Counties Where 
Districts Have Seceded, AERA OPEN, Sept. 3, 2019, at 1–10 (“Despite 
long-standing White resistance to desegregation, judicial pressure meant that the 
South’s countywide school systems (or ones that include both cities and suburbs) 
historically have been some of the most integrated for Black and White 
students.”). 
 63. DAVID H. MONK & BRIAN O. BRENT, RAISING MONEY FOR EDUCATION:  A 
GUIDE TO PROPERTY TAX (1997).  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67.  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23 (1973) 
(holding that financing schools using local property taxes was not 
unconstitutional). 
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not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. A 
recent and exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut 
concluded that “[i]t is clearly incorrect . . . to contend that the 
‘poor’ live in ‘poor’ districts. . . . Thus, the major factual 
assumption of Serrano—that the educational financing system 
discriminates against the ‘poor’—is simply false in 
Connecticut.” Defining “poor” families as those below the 
Bureau of the Census “poverty level,” the Connecticut study 
found, not surprisingly, that the poor were clustered around 
commercial and industrial areas—those same areas that 
provide the most attractive sources of property tax income for 
school districts. Whether a similar pattern would be discovered 
in Texas is not known, but there is no basis on the record in this 
case for assuming that the poorest people—defined by reference 
to any level of absolute impecunity—are concentrated in the 
poorest districts.68 
Finally, states impose various degrees of regulation over property 
taxes, including but not limited to regulating rates at which 
property taxes can be increased or regulating the amount of or 
growth in revenues that can be generated by local property taxes.69 
Some of these measures mitigate racial disparities in taxation and 
revenues generated while others exacerbate these disparities.70 
Importantly, every aspect of these systems of local property 
taxation for public schools is a function of state policy and 
governance—state policies defining taxing jurisdictions, methods 
of assessing taxable value, procedures for setting tax rates and 
collecting revenues. 
B. Insufficient General State Aid 
The second source of inequality in state school funding 
systems is essentially the state’s failure to fully address the first. 
Every state has some general state aid formula, for which the 
 
 68. Id. at 23. 
 69. See id. at 15 (“Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict 
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San 
Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State.”). 
 70. See id. at 58 (“[S]everal research projects have concluded that any 
financing alternative designed to achieve a greater equality of expenditures is 
likely to lead to higher taxation and lower educational expenditures in the major 
urban centers, a result that would exacerbate rather than ameliorate existing 
conditions in those areas.”). 
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primary objective is usually to allocate state aid—derived from 
state sales and income taxes—to offset differences in the ability of 
local taxing jurisdictions to raise revenue for their schools.71 These 
general formula aid programs, or “equalization aid” programs have 
existed since the 1920s.72 When funded adequately, achieving their 
most basic function, these aid programs would permit every local 
jurisdiction in a state to raise a specific target amount of revenue—
a foundation level—at equitable taxation, considering either or 
both taxable property wealth and income (ability to pay) of 
residents.73 States largely still fall short of this goal, though on 
average, across the country, districts serving higher 
concentrations of children from families in poverty do spend 
roughly the same as districts serving lower concentrations of 
children from families in poverty.74 There remains significant 
variation across and within states, with respect to poverty and 
with respect to race.75 
C. Stealth Inequalities 
Modern state aid formulas should generally go beyond wealth 
equalization and should also accommodate the differences in 
student needs and other costs associated with providing each child 
in the state with equal opportunity to achieve a common set of 
outcome goals.76 Doing so introduces complexities into state school 
 
 71. See generally Bruce D. Baker, Ajay Srikanth, Robert Cotto Jr., & Preston 
C. Green III, School Funding Disparities and the Plight of Latinx Children, 28 
EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS 135 (2020) (explaining the need for race-conscious school 
funding policies).  
 72.  See id. at 3 (“In theory, state school finance systems are designed to a) 
remediate disparities between local public-school districts that arise from 
differences in wealth and revenue raising capacity of those districts and b) provide 
supplemental resources to districts serving needier student populations or facing 
other cost pressures.”). 
 73. See id. at 18 (showing data suggesting equalization with equalized 
spending). 
 74. See id. (offering conclusions on the data showing inequality in Latinx 
populations). 
 75. See id. (tabling data which demonstrates the various disparities). 
 76. See PETER D. VEILLETTE, UNDERSTANDING STATE SCHOOL FINANCE 
FORMULAS 4 (1987) (explaining how race-conscious policies reduces the racial 
achievement gap).  
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finance formulas either in the form of adjustments to the general 
aid formula or addition of supplemental formulas or categorical 
grants.77 Political acceptance of the concept of adjustments to 
advance equal educational opportunity, however, has led some 
states to craft and adopt adjustments to their school finance 
formulas that do the opposite, including adjustments which 
exacerbate wealth and income related disparities or reinforce past 
racial disparities.78 Bruce Baker and Sean Corcoran referred to 
these as “stealth inequalities”—features of state aid formulas 
wherein the state itself had designed a system of allocating aid to 
make disparities worse, not better.79 We provide examples of 
stealth inequalities exacerbating race-based disparities later in 
this article. 
IV. Part III:  School Desegregation Litigation 
School desegregation and school finance litigation arose from 
the similar objective “of equalizing educational opportunities for 
poor and/or minority students.”80 School desegregation litigation 
sought to achieve this goal through integration while school 
finance litigation targeted the distribution of educational 
funding.81 In this Part, we focus on why school desegregation failed 
to correct Black-white school funding disparities. Because of school 
desegregation litigation’s focus on integration, one might conclude 
that there were no challenges to inequitable school funding.82 
However, there were instances where courts did address funding 
 
 77. See id. (discussing the operation of equalization formulas). 
 78. See Bruce D. Baker & Sean P. Corcoran, The Stealth Inequalities of 
School Funding:  How State and Local School Finance Systems Perpetuate 
Inequitable Student Spending, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.statewideonline.org/111312/files/StealthInequities%20Rutgers.pdf. 
[perma.cc/Q7H5-TEZY] (discussing the approaches of different states in using 
different aid formulas). 
 79. See id. (describing “stealth inequalities” as “inequities not solely due to 
differences in available resources.”). 
 80. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 258 (1999).  
 81. See id. at 259 (“[S]chool desegregation cases sought equality indirectly 
through integration.”). 
 82. Id.  
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disparities in school desegregation litigation.83 This part discusses 
these cases and explains why they were unsuccessful in remedying 
Black-white school funding disparities. 
A. Hobson v. Hansen 
In Hobson v. Hansen,84 a federal district court addressed 
whether the District of Columbia complied with Bolling v. 
Sharpe,85 a companion case to Brown.86 The court held that the 
disparity in resources between Black and white elementary schools 
was considerably unequal and was thus unconstitutional as well.87 
The typical school building serving Black students was almost 
sixty years old, which was twenty years below the median age of 
other school buildings in the city.88 Black schools operated at 115% 
of capacity, while white schools generally operated at 77% 
capacity.89 Teachers in the Black schools had much less teaching 
experience and were twice as likely to have only temporary 
licenses.90 In contrast, white schools had a large number of 
teachers with graduate degrees, a feature that was atypical of 
predominantly Black schools.91 Median per-pupil expenditures for 
Black schools were $100 fewer than those of white schools.92 
Finally, students attending Black schools had much less access to 
kindergarten than students attending white schools.93 However, 
 
 83. See infra Section IV.A  
 84. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269. F. Supp. 401, 405–06 (D.D.C. 1967) (holding 
that the school board and superintendent of public schools in Washington, D.C. 
unconstitutionally deprived Black children of their right to equal educational 
opportunities).  
 85. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that segregation 
in public schools was a violation of the Due Process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment). 
 86. See Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 405–06 (stating that the Court used Hobson 
to “test the current compliance of Washington D.C. public schools’ compliance 
with the principles announced in Bolling and Brown v. Board of Education”). 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 495. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 495–96. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. (explaining access to kindergarten for Black children was 
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the court found that the disparities between Black and white 
schools were not caused by intentional discrimination, but rather 
by the indifference of school administrators.94 
The court held that withholding equal educational 
opportunities from Black students in the District of Columbia 
denied them equal protection of the law.95 In reaching this 
decision, the court fashioned a new separate-but-equal doctrine to 
address inequalities caused by de facto segregation.96 As the court 
explained, “it should be clear that if whites and Negroes, or rich 
and poor, are to be consigned to separate schools pursuant to 
whatever policy, the minimum the Constitution will require and 
guarantee is that for their objectively measurable aspects these 
schools should be run on the basis of real equality, at least unless 
any inequalities are adequately justified.”97 The court supported 
this assertion by explaining, “Whatever the law was once, it is a 
testament to our maturing concept of equality that, with the help 
of Supreme Court decisions in the last decade, we now firmly 
recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as 
disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as 
the perversity of a willful scheme.”98 
In the Rodriguez decision, however, the Supreme Court 
dramatically weakened the efficacy of the Equal Protection Clause 
for challenging racial funding disparities.99 The Rodriguez Court 
 
dependent on classroom space). 
 94. See id. at 442 (“The causes of the inequalities are relatively objective and 
impersonal. School officials can be faulted, but for another reason: that in the face 
of these inequalities they have sometimes shown little concern.”). 
 95. Id. at 496. This case was decided under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, which the Supreme Court held contains an equal protection 
component.  
 96. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 496 (1967) (discussing how the 
court considered “whether these documented inequalities in the predominantly 
Negro schools den[ied] the children who [were] assigned by defendants to attend 
them equal educational opportunity and equal protection of the law” in reaching 
its conclusion). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 497. 
 99. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) 
(holding that Texas’s school funding plan, which created unequal wealth 
distribution between school districts, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because the proper standard is whether the challenged state action rationally 
furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest. The court held that Texas’s scheme 
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held that existing disparities in funding between school districts 
that resulted from Texas’s reliance on local property taxation were 
permissible.100 The Court rejected the claim that the school finance 
system should be subject to strict scrutiny because the plaintiffs 
were members of a suspect classification based upon wealth.101  
The Court also rejected the notion that strict scrutiny was 
applicable because education was a fundamental interest under 
the Constitution.102 
Instead of strict scrutiny, the Court found that the rational 
basis test was the appropriate form of analysis.103 The Court then 
concluded that the use of local property taxation was rationally 
related to encouraging local control of the public schools.104 By 
becoming involved in educational decisions at the local level, 
community members demonstrated their depth of commitment to 
public education.105 Local control also provided each locality with 
the means for participating “in the decision-making process of 
determining how local tax dollars will be spent.”106 Moreover, local 
control enabled school districts “to tailor local plans for local needs” 
and encouraged “experimentation, innovation, and a healthy 
competition for educational excellence.”107 
 
met this standard). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 19–29 (concluding that “the Texas system does not operate to 
the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class . . . in recognition of the fact that 
this Court has never . . . held that wealth discrimination alone provides an 
adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees have not relied solely on this 
contention”). 
 102. See id. at 29–39 (discussing fundamental rights generally and ultimately 
noting that the Court had “carefully considered each of the arguments supportive 
of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and 
have found those arguments unpersuasive”). 
 103. See id. at 40 (“A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal 
Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of the traditional 
standard of review, which requires only that the State's system be shown to bear 
some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”). 
 104. See id. at 55 (“The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection 
Clause is whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate 
state purpose or interest.”). 
 105. See id. at 49 (“The persistence of attachment to government at the lowest 
level where education is concerned reflects the depth of commitment of its 
supporters.”). 
 106. Id. at 50.  
 107. Id. at 51.  
500 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 483 (2021) 
Although the Equal Protection Clause challenge in Rodriguez 
was based on wealth disparities, it is important to observe that the 
case served as an implicit rejection of the equality standard used 
in Hobson.108 Indeed, Taunya Lovell Banks observes that “[r]ace, 
in the broadest sense, was the elephant in the courtroom.”109 She 
further points out that the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, who were 
“characterized as poor and Mexican-American, seemed to be 
arguing that state educational funding determinations based on 
wealth not only impair a fundamental right, but also are suspect 
under the Equal Protection Clause . . . when these decisions 
disproportionately impact racialized groups.”110 The Supreme 
Court removed all doubt about the validity of Hobson in 
Washington v. Davis111 by holding that a statute or official practice 
was not rendered unconstitutional by having an adverse disparate 
impact on minority groups.112 As the Court explained: 
[V]arious Courts of Appeals have held in several 
contexts . . . that the substantially disproportionate racial 
impact of a statute or official practice standing alone and 
without regard to discriminatory purpose, suffices to prove 
racial discrimination violating the Equal Protection 
Clause . . . . [T]o the extent that those cases rested on or 
expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose 
is unnecessary in making out an equal protection violation, we 
are in disagreement.113 
B. Milliken v. Bradley 
It was not until the Milliken v. Bradley114 litigation that the 
Supreme Court sanctioned the imposition of educational 
 
 108. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 496 (1967) (holding that schools 
objectively measurable aspects be run on the basis of real equality, at least unless 
any inequalities are adequately justified). 
 109. Taunya Lovell Banks, Brown at 50:  Reconstructing Brown’s Promise, 44 
WASHBURN L.J. 39, 59 (2004).  
 110. Id.  
 111. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 252 (1976) (finding that a police 
department’s use of employment test for hiring purposes did not violate Equal 
Protection Clause).  
 112. Id. at 244–45. 
 113. Id.  
 114. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977) (holding 
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programming—and additional spending to implement these 
programs—as part of court-ordered desegregation plans.115 In 
Milliken I,116 the Court invalidated a desegregation plan that 
would have called for the integration of Detroit’s predominantly 
Black school districts with the predominantly white suburban 
school districts.117 The Court ruled in this manner because there 
was no evidence of intentional discrimination on the part of the 
latter districts.118 As a result of Milliken I, racial residential 
segregation across established school district lines has remained a 
primary cause of racial segregation in schooling in many parts of 
the country.119 
In Milliken II,120 the Court approved a Detroit-only plan that 
included educational components such as remedial reading, 
in-service teacher training, nondiscriminatory testing reforms, 
testing, and counseling.121 The Court upheld the plan because the 
federal judiciary “need not, and cannot, close their eyes to 
inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a longstanding 
 
that prospective relief to bring about educational equality was not barred by the 
Tenth or Eleventh Amendment).  
 115. See id. at 267–68 (affirming the District Court order implementing the 
student assignment plan and associated educational components). 
 116. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (holding 
that it was improper to impose a multi-district remedy for a single-district de jure 
segregation action without evidence that the included districts acted in a way that 
effected segregation).  
 117. See id. at 748–53 (concluding that “the relief ordered by the District 
Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was based upon an erroneous 
standard and was unsupported by record evidence that acts of the outlying 
districts effected the discrimination found to exist in the schools of Detroit” and 
remanding the case”). 
 118. See id. at 745 (“To approve the remedy ordered by the court would impose 
on the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional 
violation, a wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted at in 
Brown I and II or any holding of this Court.”).  
 119. Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands:  The Jurisprudence of Integration Past, 
Present, and Future, 47 HOW. L.J. 795, 811 (2004); Sheryll D. Cashin, American 
Public Schools Fifty Years after Brown:  A Separate But Equal Reality, 47 HOW. 
L.J. 341, 347 (2004); Ryan, supra note 80, at 261.  
 120. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977).  
 121. See id. at 290–91 (affirming the affirming the District Court order 
implementing the student assignment plan and associated educational 
components). 
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segregated system.”122 In the words of James Ryan, “If the schools 
were going to be separate as a result of Milliken I, Milliken II 
seemed to hold out the possibility that they might be equal.”123 
Despite the Court’s apparent recognition that educational 
spending was necessary to overcome the effects of segregation, 
Gary Orfield and colleagues have labeled Milliken II remedies as 
a “limited form of reparations” that has not been implemented 
successfully.124 “A fundamental weakness” of Milliken II remedies 
was “that the extra funding to segregated schools [was] not 
guaranteed to last.”125 Indeed, “[t]he programs suffer from 
impermanence because they often depend upon tenuous political 
support and politicized local or state budget processes.”126 
Therefore, “the programs can be easily removed by courts or school 
districts even where there is no proof that the programs have done 
what they were supposed to—improve conditions for minority 
students.”127 That the programs’ survival depends upon a thin web 
of political support and budgetary responsibilities is particularly 
troubling because these schools serve communities that are 
traditionally weak players in local politics.”128 
Missouri v. Jenkins129 is perhaps the most striking example of 
the failure of Milliken II desegregation plans to implement a 
reparations plan for Black students.130 In this case, a district court 
ruled that the Kansas City School District (KCMSD) and the state 
of Missouri had committed de jure segregation.131 The judge then 
attempted to improve the “desegregative attractiveness” of the 
district’s schools by implementing a district-wide magnet school 
 
 122. Id. at 283.  
 123. Ryan, supra note 80, at 261.  
 124. GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:  THE 
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 12 (1997).  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995) (holding that the district 
court overstepped its remedial authority in creating a magnet school program). 
 130. See generally id.  
 131. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1505–06 (D. Mo. 1984) (noting 
that the state had the “constitutional obligation to affirmatively dismantle any 
system of de jure segregation” and that the state and school district “defaulted in 
their obligation to uphold the Constitution”). 
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program.132 The Supreme Court ruled that the magnet school 
program exceeded the district court’s remedial authority.133 
Critics of increased school finance spending have cited the 
Jenkins case as evidence that there is no correlation between 
increased educational funding and educational outcomes.134 Their 
argument is based on three premises:  (1) KCMSD received a great 
deal more money than any other large school district in the country 
over an extended period; (2) because the exorbitant spending did 
not lead to improved student outcomes, the plan is a national 
model for why spending large sums of money on predominantly 
Black schools is non-productive and inefficient; and (3) the state of 
Missouri covered a disproportionate share of the costs of the 
desegregation plan which indirectly harmed the state’s other 
school districts.135 
Preston Green and Bruce Baker have challenged these claims 
regarding the Jenkins case.136 Their empirical analysis of KCMSD 
spending revealed that “peak funding lasted for a relative short 
period of time.”137 Because KCMSD was a high-spending school 
district for such a short time, it could not be considered the “poster 
child” for the assertion that “money doesn’t matter” with respect to 
student outcomes.138 Further, Green and Baker determined that 
the KCMSD’s property taxpayers consistently paid a much higher 
share of the district’s state and local operating revenue than other 
districts across the state.139 Finally, Green and Baker found that 
 
 132. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 75.  
 133. See id. at 92–93 (differentiating the magnet school remedy in this case 
from previous upheld cases). 
 134. See Preston C. Green III & Bruce D. Baker, Urban Legends, 
Desegregation and School Finance:  Did Kansas City Really Prove That Money 
Doesn’t Matter?, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 58 (2006) (“A number of courts that 
have invalidated their school finance systems did so after finding a correlation 
between educational funding and academic outcomes. Conservative critics have 
countered that Missouri v. Jenkins. . . proves that no such correlation exists.”). 
 135. Id. at 82–84 (summarizing arguments against increased education 
funding).  
 136. See id. at 80 (“[A]nalysis of the Jenkins litigation reveals that Judge 
Clark attempted to enforce remedies on KCMSD and the state of Missouri by 
relying on the federal court precedents made by Milliken I and Milliken II.”). 
 137. Id. at 100.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
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the redistribution of statewide additional state revenues to 
KCMSD amounted to $78 per pupil—a relatively small sum.140  
Green and Baker then ask how the premises of the Jenkins 
critique could be so “distorted.” As they explain, this assessment: 
[F]ails to take into account the history of KCMSD and the state 
of Missouri. We have observed that the residential structure 
and demographics of KCMSD were carefully crafted by city 
officials and real estate developers into racially segregated 
enclaves for the first 60 years of the 20th century. We have also 
noted that in the 1960s, KCMSD was a relatively high spending 
district, but because of the school funding system’s reliance on 
property taxation and KCMSD’s racial and socio-economic 
composition, the district would soon be unable to meet its 
educational needs. Moreover, we explained that Judge Clark 
responded to KCMSD’s financial concerns in the Jenkins 
litigation by imposing an extremely high property tax rate on 
the district.141 
Thus, Green and Baker reason, it was easy to understand “that the 
Jenkins litigation only temporarily shifted KCMSD’s relative 
funding levels compared with either a national peer group of 
metropolitan districts or a local labor market peer group.”142 This 
analysis of Jenkins is consistent with Orfield’s critique of Milliken 
II plans—they are a form of limited reparations that do not last 
long enough to undo the harm caused by consistent underfunding. 
V. Part IV:  School Finance Litigation 
As noted above, school finance litigation seeks to achieve equal 
educational opportunities for minority and poor students by 
targeting the distribution of educational funding.143 Legal scholars 
have identified three waves of school funding challenges.144 In the 
 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 100–01.  
 142. Id. at 101.  
 143. See Green et al., supra note 12, at 284 ("The goal of school finance 
litigation is ‘to increase the amount and equalize the distribution of academic 
opportunities and performance of students disadvantaged by existing finance 
schemes.’”). 
 144. See generally, Carlee Poston Escue, William E. Thro, & R. Craig Wood, 
Some Perspectives on Recent School Finance Litigation, 268 ED. LAW REP. 601, 
601 (2011); David Hinojosa, “Race-Conscious” School Finance Litigation:  Is a 
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first wave, plaintiffs claimed that school funding disparities 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.145 The Supreme Court closed this door in its 
Rodriguez decision discussed above.146 In the second wave, 
litigants based their school finance challenges on state equal 
protection clauses.147 They sought to distinguish their claims from 
Rodriguez by arguing that education was a fundamental right, 
thus triggering the strict scrutiny standard instead of the more 
lenient rational basis analysis.148 Although plaintiffs had success 
in the early stages of this wave, courts grew resistant to this legal 
theory by the end of the second wave.149 During the third wave, 
plaintiffs asserted that states have provided insufficient resources 
either to achieve minimal educational outcomes or to prepare 
students to “become positive contributors to the economic, social 
and democratic fabric.”150 Plaintiffs have had more success in the 
third wave, winning two-thirds of cases during this period.151 
Although school finance litigation has generally steered clear 
of race, there have been several instances where plaintiffs have 
directly challenged school funding policies that have caused racial 
disparities and demanded that states take race into account to 
 
Fourth Wave Emerging?, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 869, 871 (2016); William S. Koski, 
Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints:  A Re-examination of the 
Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2003); Ann Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity 
vs. Adequacy Debate:  Implications for Rural School Finance Litigation, 82 NEB. 
L. REV. 133, 137 (2003); William Thro, School Finance Litigation as Facial 
Challenges, 272 ED. LAW REP. 687, 694 (2011).  
 145. See Hinojosa, supra note 144, at 872 (“[T]hese cases filed claims under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 146. See id. (explaining how Rodriguez ended the first wave). 
 147. See id. (pointing to the development of suits based on state constitutional 
claims). 
 148. See id. (identifying the strategic advantage of equal protection claims 
with strict scrutiny). 
 149. See id. at 873 (pointing to courts growing reluctance to hear the state 
equal protection claims). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. (“[F]avor of the plaintiffs with wins in two-thirds of cases over the 
past twenty-two years.”). 
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remedy them.152 The remainder of this part summarizes these 
cases. 
A. Alabama:  Lynch v. Alabama 
In Lynch v. Alabama,153 the plaintiffs alleged that the state’s 
property tax system was “rooted in [the State’s] historic racially 
discriminatory policies . . . and cripple the ability of certain rural, 
nearly all-[B]lack public systems in Alabama to raise revenues” in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.154 One especially 
problematic constitutional provision was Amendment 373, which 
established a property classification system “for determining the 
value of the property that is subject to a given tax rate.”155 This 
amendment allowed Class III property, “which includes 
agricultural, forest, and single residential property,” to be taxed at 
ten percent of its value instead of fair market value.156 This 
amendment severely limited the ability of rural “Black Belt” school 
districts to obtain educational funding because “very little of the 
property’s true fair market value [is] subject to taxation.”157 
The plaintiffs attempted to establish discriminatory intent by 
attempting to connect Amendment 373 to the state’s antipathy 
against funding public education for Black students.158 This 
hostility was evidenced, inter alia, in the 1901 Constitution, which 
prevented Blacks from raising revenue for schools by 
disfranchising them and placing restrictions on property 
 
 152. See id. at 870 (listing Martinez v. New Mexico and Silver v. Halifax 
County School Board Association as two examples of such cases and discussing 
each in context). 
 153. See Lynch v. Alabama, No. 08-S-450-NE, 2011 WL 13186739 (N.D. Ala. 
Nov. 7, 2011), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom., I.L. v. Alabama, 
739 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court’s rejection of the claim 
that Alabama’s tax policies had a continuing segregative effect on its system of 
higher education).  
 154. I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2014).  
 155. Id. at 1282.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
 158. Id. at 1286–87 (discerning no error in the “district court’s finding that 
Amendment 373 was not racially motivated”). 
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taxation.159 A federal district court disagreed.160 While there was 
overwhelming evidence that the state passed the 1901 constitution 
with “virulent, racially-discriminatory intent,”161 the court 
reasoned that Amendment 373 was “a reaction to the increases in 
property appraisals and assessments mandated by [a prior court 
decision], and the accompanying threat of a tremendous increase 
in the property taxes paid by large landowners.”162 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
ruling that racial discrimination was not a substantial or 
motivating factor behind the enactment of Amendment 373, 
finding that the lower court did not clearly err in choosing to credit 
the evidence supporting this conclusion.163 
B. Kansas:  Montoy v. Kansas 
In the Montoy v. Kansas litigation,164  school districts enrolling 
large shares of Black and Latinx students alleged that the state’s 
school finance formula violated equal protection and educational 
provisions.165 A significant portion of the state’s school funding 
woes can be traced to a series of funding and organizational 
policies that worked in tandem to create unequal and inadequate 
 
 159. See Lynch v. Alabama, No. 08-S-450-NE, 2011 WL 13186739, at *256–
66. (N.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2011) aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom., I.L. 
v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that the 1901 Constitution 
was “about race and nothing but race” and passed with the intention of ensuring 
white supremacy). 
 160. See id. at *332 (“[T]he amendments ratified in 1972 and 1978 were not 
measures adopted for the purpose of depriving black public school students of 
adequate funding for education.”). 
 161. Id. at *327. 
 162. Id. at *332. 
 163. I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2014) (pointing to the 
lower court’s extensive discussion of the state’s history of race relations). 
 164. See Montoy v. Kansas, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *7 (Kan. 
Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 120 P.3d 306 (Kan. 2005) 
(holding that compliance with Kansas Const. art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 could only be 
achieved if sufficient funds were derived, through regular dependable taxes, to 
permit district schools to provide basic education in a general and uniform system 
of public schools.) 
 165. See id. at *9 (summarizing the arguments before the Kansas Supreme 
Court and the questions on remand). 
508 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 483 (2021) 
funding systems.166 Indeed, Brown addressed a Kansas policy that 
empowered cities with populations larger than 15,000 to operate 
racially segregated schools.167 Brown invalidated this legislative 
practice.168 
In the aftermath of Brown, the state legislature enacted a 
series of racially neutral state aid and district policies that had the 
effect of perpetuating Kansas’s “separate and unequal” systems of 
public education.169 Nine years after this decision, the state 
legislature passed the School Unification Law of 1963, which 
encouraged rural school districts to consolidate with each other.170 
But these districts did not consolidate with nearby urban districts 
with high concentrations of minority students.171 The legislature 
in turn provided more funding to these consolidated rural districts 
than their urban neighbors through state aid for low-enrollment 
school districts.172 The state also provided more funding to 
predominantly white suburbs than their urban counterparts 
through state aid adjustments including “extraordinary growth” 
and “new facilities aid,” designed to account for district growth.173 
In the Montoy litigation, a state trial court issued a 
preliminary order holding that the state’s funding disparities had 
an unconstitutional disparate impact on minority and 
English-learner students in violation of the state and federal equal 
protection clauses.174 The court also ruled that the state had failed 
 
 166. See id. at *37 (“Plaintiffs . . . alleged that the total funds provided by the 
Legislature, even if all its base allotments, weights, LOBs, capital outlays, sales 
taxes, and other allowances and supplements are combined, [was] grossly 
inadequate in the aggregate to provide a suitable education to all Kansas 
children[.]”). 
 167. Green et al., supra note 12, at 306.  
 168. See id. at 306–07 (“Brown negated the legislature's ability to preserve 
segregated schools within these city boundaries.”) 
 169. See id. at 307 (noting that “[t]he state legislature subsequently enacted 
a series of funding and organizational policies that worked in tandem to create 
racially unequal funding systems” after Brown). 
 170. See id. (stating that the School Unification Law of 1963 was designed to 
decrease the number of school districts in the state). 
 171. See id. (explaining the effect of unification leading to de facto 
segregation). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Montoy v. Kansas, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *49 (Kan. Dist. 
Ct. Dec. 2, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 120 P.3d 306 (Kan. 2005) (“The Court 
SCHOOL FINANCE, RACE, AND REPARATIONS 509 
to satisfy its duty under the education clause to provide Kansas’s 
children with a “suitable education.”175 In reaching this latter 
conclusion, the court observed with alarm the fact that “minorities, 
disabled, [and] non English speakers . . . are failing at alarming 
rates” on the state’s assessment system.”176 For example, “83.7 
percent of Kansas African American students, 81.1 percent of 
Kansas Hispanic students, 64.1 percent of Kansas Native 
American students, 87.1 percent of Kansas limited English 
proficiency students, and 77.5 percent of Kansas impoverished 
students” were failing the tenth-grade mathematics assessment.177  
The court also found that increases in educational funding 
would enable districts to employ strategies, such as reducing class 
sizes and hiring better trained teachers that could raise the 
academic performance of minority and disadvantaged students.178 
It also rejected the defendants’ attempt to justify the academic 
performance of Kansas’s marginalized students with a reference to 
lynchings:  
Even more troublesome is Defendants’ well-phrased and 
superficially attractive argument that even if one chooses to 
examine alarming student failure rates of Kansas minorities, 
poor, disabled, and limited English, one finds these failure rates 
compare “favorably” with similar failure rates for such persons 
elsewhere. Reduced to its simplest and clearest terms, this 
argument suggests that there is “no problem” in Kansas since 
our vulnerable and/or protected students aren’t performing any 
worse than such students are performing elsewhere. This 
argument seems to the Court to be on a par with the following 
statement:  “Persons of color should be comforted by the fact 
that lynchings in Kansas are no more frequent than lynchings 
in many other states.”179 
 
hereby concludes, for all the reasons stated, but almost entirely as a matter of 
fact, that the current school funding scheme stands in blatant violation of Article 
6 of the Kansas Constitution and the equal protection clauses of both the Kansas 
and United States Constitutions[.]”). 
 175. Id. at *43.  
 176. Id. at *40. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at *48 (noting that the court believed the testimony of Kansas 
educators regarding what resources they would need to successfully educate their 
students). 
 179. Id. at *43.  
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On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court’s finding that the school finance system violated state and 
federal equal protection provisions.180 The court rejected the racial 
disparity claim because the plaintiffs did not establish a 
discriminatory purpose.181 But the court did agree with the finding 
that the state school finance system “fails to provide adequate 
funding for a suitable education for students of their and other 
similarly situated districts, i.e., middle- and large-sized districts 
with a high proportion of minority and/or at-risk and special 
education students.”182 The major concern was that the formula 
was based on political compromises that had “distorted” the 
various cost adjustments, including those for low enrollment, at 
risk, and bilingual education programs.183 In reaching this 
decision, the court found that the state had failed to satisfy its own 
definition of “a suitable provision for finance” of the public schools, 
which was based on state accreditation standards and student 
academic performance measures.184 The court also referenced a 
legislatively-commissioned study which found that the school 
finance system needed an additional $853 million to satisfy the 
legislature’s standard.185 
To satisfy the constitutional mandate, the court observed that 
“[i]t is clear increased funding will be required; however, increased 
funding may not in and of itself make the financing formula 
constitutionally suitable.”186 Other considerations included “[t]he 
equity with which the funds are distributed and the actual costs of 
education, including appropriate levels of administrative costs.”187 
The Kansas Supreme Court retained jurisdiction to give the 
legislature time to correct the constitutional deficiencies with the 
 
 180. See Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 308 (2005) (reversing the district court 
various grounds). 
 181. See id. (finding no discriminatory purpose necessary for equal protection 
purposes). 
 182. Id. at 310.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 309. 
 185. See id. at 309–10 (discussing the Augenblick & Myers study as evidence 
that suitable education is not being provided); see also Montoy, 2003 WL 
22902963, at *39 (describing in further detail the same study). 
 186. Montoy, 120 P.3d at 310. 
 187. Id. 
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current school funding formula.188 In the meantime, the current 
school funding formula would remain in effect.189 
Although the trial and state supreme court decisions 
specifically cited the racial composition of the school districts that 
received constitutionally inadequate funding, in subsequent 
decisions, the Kansas Supreme Court mandated remedies in terms 
of aggregate dollars.190 There was no reference to how this money 
should be dispensed in a manner that targeted Black schools.191  
C. Mississippi:  Williams v. Reeves 
In the ongoing Williams v. Reeves192 lawsuit, plaintiffs are 
alleging that Mississippi has failed its educational obligations to 
Black students under the Mississippi Readmission Act of 1870.193 
The statute imposes a number of “fundamental conditions” for the 
state’s readmission into the Union, including one that prohibited 
the state from “amend[ing] or chang[ing]” its constitution in a 
manner that “deprive[s] any citizens of the United States of the 
school rights and privileges secured by the constitution of said 
State.”194 The plaintiffs, who are low-income Black women whose 
children attend state public schools, claim the present version of 
the education clause violates the “school rights and privileges” 
 
 188. See id. (staying all further proceedings to allow the legislature the time 
to take steps necessary to fulfill its “constitutional responsibility”). 
 189. See id. at 310–11 (withholding the formal opinion until corrective 
legislation is enacted to ensure the legislature complies with the holding). 
 190.  See Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 940 (Kan. 2005) (discussing Kansas 
students and districts in general without reference to predominately Black 
districts). 
 191. Id. 
 192.  See Williams ex rel v. Bryant, No. 3:17-CV-404-WHB-LRA, 2019 WL 
3757948 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 4, 2019), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub 
nom. Williams ex rel v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 739 (5th Cir. 2020), reh’g denied, 
981 F.3d 437 (en banc) (holding the Mississippi Constitution violated the 
Mississippi Readmission Act but that the judicial declaration asked for could not 
proceed under standing precedent). 
 193. See id. (discussing how the complaint alleges that amendments made to 
the education clause of the Mississippi Constitution violate the Mississippi 
Readmission Act and resulted in disparity in the education provided to students 
attending either predominately white or predominately Black schools). 
 194. An Act to Admit the State of Mississippi to Representation in the 
Congress of the United States 41st Cong. Ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (1870). 
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provision of the statute.195 In 1987, the state amended the 1868 
version of the education clause, which required the states to 
establish “a uniform system of free public schools” by removing the 
reference to uniformity.196 Thus, the education clause merely 
imposes a duty on the legislature to provide a system of “free public 
schools.”197 According to the plaintiffs, the deletion of the 
uniformity requirement has “caused them to suffer a number of 
injuries, including illiteracy, a diminished likelihood of high school 
graduation, low rates of college attendance and college completion, 
and an increased likelihood of future poverty.”198 A federal district 
court dismissed the lawsuit because of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.199 But the Fifth Circuit reversed, pointing out that a 
party may sue a state official in their official capacity if the suit 
seeks prospective instead of retrospective relief.200 In an en banc 
ruling, the Fifth Circuit refused to rehear the panel decision.201 
D. New Mexico:  Martinez v. New Mexico 
In this consolidated lawsuit, the plaintiffs asserted that the 
state had failed to provide at-risk students—including Native 
American and English Language Learners (ELL)—an adequate 
education pursuant to the State’s education clause requiring the 
state to provide a “uniform system of public schools.”202 The 
 
 195. Williams II, 954 F.3d at 732.  
 196. Id. at 733. 
 197. See id. (referencing the 1987 version of the Mississippi Constitution). 
 198. Id.  
 199. See Williams I, 2019 WL 3757948 at *2 (finding that Mississippi would 
be a real and substantial party in interest to the case because the requested 
declaratory judgement would result in changes being made to the Mississippi 
Constitution). 
 200. See Williams II, 954 F.3d at 738 (discussing that as long as the claim 
seeks prospective relief for ongoing harm, the fact that a current violation can be 
traced to a past action does not bar relief). 
 201. See Williams II, 981 F.3d at 437–38 (writing that eight judges voted in 
favor of rehearing while nine judges voted against rehearing). 
 202. See Martinez v. New Mexico, No. D-101-CV-2014-00793, 2018 WL 
9489378, at *2 (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 20, 2018) (discussing the constitutional 
obligation of the state to provide sufficient education for children categorized as 
“at-risk”). 
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plaintiffs also brought a state equal protection clause challenge 
against the state.203 
In 2018, a state trial court agreed with the plaintiffs’ education 
clause claim, finding that the evidence showed that the education 
provided to the state’s at-risk students was inadequate.204 The 
court outlined the failure in terms of educational inputs, such as 
instructional materials, reasonable curricula, and quality of 
teaching.205 With respect to instructional materials, the court 
referenced, inter alia, the defendants’ failure to comply with the 
New Mexico Indian Education Act, a statute that required the 
state to provide “culturally relevant instructional materials for 
Native American students enrolled in public schools.”206 Districts 
with significant Native American populations failed to achieve the 
expected cooperation between district’s schools and tribal 
communities.207 The court also took notice of the State 
Department’s failure to fill positions instrumental in fulfilling the 
statute’s purpose as well as the failure to develop 
government-to-government relationship between the state and 
New Mexico tribes.208 
As to curriculum, the court took notice of the state’s failure to 
provide programs to ELL students that would help them learn 
English.209 The state constitution as well as state and federal 
statutes required such programming for students who were not 
 
 203. See id. at *59–60 (discussing how case law rejects education-related 
claims under the federal equal protection clause and that cases thereafter were 
based on the clauses in most state constitutions interpreted to be equivalent to 
the equal protection clause). 
 204. See id. at *25 (finding that New Mexico failed to meet the obligation to 
provide every student with the opportunity to obtain an education that allows 
them to become prepped for career or college). 
 205. See id. at *25–37 (analyzing both educational inputs and outputs to 
determine whether the education provided is constitutionally adequate). 
 206. See id. at *27–28 (referencing failure to comply with the Act as 
amounting to a violation of the constitution’s adequacy clause).  
 207. See id. at *28 (noting the goal of the Act has not been realized in most of 
the districts with significant Native American student populations). 
 208. See id. at *28–29 (referencing the failure to fill three regional Indian 
Education Department positions and lack of development of relationships to 
achieve the statutory goals).  
 209. See id. at *31 (finding there is a lack of sufficient monitoring programs 
to determine if ELL students receive adequate assistance). 
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proficient in English.210 In addition, the state department of 
education lacked sufficient monitoring to ensure that ELL 
students were receiving adequate assistance in learning English 
or to track the training provided to teachers of ELL students.211 
Finally, the department had failed to provide a framework that the 
district could use to provide multicultural education.212 With 
respect to teaching, the court concluded that the quality of teaching 
for at-risk students was inadequate.213 The state’s high-poverty 
schools had a disproportionately high number of low-paid, 
entry-level teachers.214 Furthermore, high poverty schools and 
high ELL schools had fewer teachers rated effective or better than 
their low poverty rate and low ELL counterparts.215 Moreover, the 
state failed to provide funding that would lower student-teacher 
ratios for ELL students to fifteen-to-one, which was ideal for 
language attainment.216 
The court also cited student outputs as evidence of the state’s 
failure to provide a constitutionally adequate education.217 While 
New Mexico’s children ranked at the bottom of the country in 
terms of educational achievement, low-income Native American 
and ELL students performed much worse.218 For instance, on state 
standardized tests, the majority of the state’s fourth, eighth, and 
eleventh graders were not proficient in math or reading.219 In 
 
 210. See id. (noting that such programs are required by legislation such as 
bilingual programs, required action to overcome language barriers that prevent 
equal participation, and by the state constitution). 
 211. See id. at *31–32 (finding that the Public Education Department did not 
track training given to teachers who educate ELL students).  
 212. See id. at *32 (finding no provided framework for districts to use in 
providing multicultural education). 
 213. See id. at *33 (concluding that the weight of the evidence shows the 
quality of teaching for at-risk students is inadequate). 
 214. See id. (noting that it is well-recognized that inexperienced teachers are 
systematically less effective than experienced teachers). 
 215. See id. (finding that teachers in those schools had lower average 
evaluation scores). 
 216. See id. at *37 (citing research that shows ELL students benefit from 
smaller class sizes and increased attention in the classroom). 
 217. See id. at *37–46 (classifying outputs as test results, graduation rates, 
and frequency of need for remedial courses in college). 
 218. See id. at *37–38 (citing study measuring proficiency levels of students 
in reading and math). 
 219. See id. at *37 (finding that, on average, these students were three years 
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contrast, low-income, Native American and ELL students ranged 
from four to fifteen percent proficiency on these tests.220 High 
school graduation rates were another problematic educational 
output.221 While New Mexico had the lowest graduation rate in the 
country (fifty-four to seventy percent),222 the graduate rate for 
Native Americans was much lower (forty-five to sixty-five 
percent).223 
The court found further evidence of failure in the college 
remediation rates.224 About half of the state’s high school 
graduates needed remediation and were, thus, not ready for 
college.225 The need for remediation was even higher for Native 
American students (fifty-nine percent) and Latinx students 
(sixty-eight percent).226 The court attributed the inadequacy of the 
educational system to insufficient funding.227 For example, it found 
that parts of the school finance formula that were geared toward 
ELL students, such as the at-risk factor and below-the-line 
funding, were insufficient to meet the educational needs of ELL 
students.228 
The court also found that the school finance formula violated 
the state equal protection clause with respect to ELL and 
educationally disadvantaged students.229 The court concluded that 
 
behind grade level). 
 220. Id. at *38.  
 221. See id. at *41 (discussing the consistently low high school graduation rate 
in New Mexico, with the 2013–14 school year being the lowest in the United 
States). 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. at *42.  
 224. See id. (finding that many of the students who did go to college needed 
substantial remedial help). 
 225. See id. at *42–43 (providing evidence in the form of witnesses for both 
sides that testified students who have to take remedial coursework once arriving 
to college are not college-ready). 
 226. See id. at *43 (citing report conducted by the Legislative Finance 
Committee). 
 227. See id. at *45 (rejecting defendants’ position that additional recourses 
cannot improve achievement by using evidence that money spent on classroom 
instruction programs, extended school year, and quality teachers can improve the 
performance of at-risk students). 
 228. See id. at *47–49 (discussing the complexity of the at-risk factor formula 
and the lack of availability of below-the-line funding grants to all districts).  
 229. See id. at *62 (discussing how many state constitutions have equality 
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Rodriguez was inapplicable because the state constitution 
guaranteed a right to a “uniform system of free public schools.”230 
Instead of rational basis analysis, the court determined that 
intermediate scrutiny applied to the plaintiffs’ claim, meaning that 
the classification had to be substantially related to an important 
governmental interest.231 The current funding scheme failed this 
standard of review because singling out educational disadvantaged 
and ELL students for adverse treatment bore no substantial 
relationship to any legitimate purpose to be achieved by the 
educational funding system.232 
The court issued an order requiring the defendants “to take 
immediate steps to ensure that New Mexico schools have the 
resources necessary to give at-risk students the opportunity to 
obtain a uniform and sufficient education that prepares them for 
college and career.”233 In June 2020, the trial court rejected a 
motion by the defendants to dismiss the case, meaning that the 
court would maintain jurisdiction of the case until the state 
implemented the reforms required by the order.234 
E. North Carolina:  Silver v. Halifax County Board of 
Commissioners 
In Silver v. Halifax County Board of Commissioners,235 
plaintiffs alleged that a board of county commissioners failed to 
provide students in the county with a “sound basic education” 
guaranteed by North Carolina’s education clause.236 This lawsuit 
 
clauses specific to schools, which may guarantee uniform or thorough and efficient 
public schools).  
 230. See id. at *61 (quoting the New Mexico Constitution). 
 231. See id. at *62 (ruling out rational basis because the review applies to 
general social and economic legislation, not that which affects a fundamental or 
important constitutional right or sensitive class). 
 232. See id. (elaborating on the substantially related to an important 
government interest test needed to pass intermediate scrutiny).  
 233. Id. at *74.  
 234. See Martinez v. New Mexico, No. D-101-CV-2014-00793 (N.M. Dist. Ct. 
Jul. 14, 2020) (retaining jurisdiction until New Mexico implements long-term, 
comprehensive reforms consistent with the final order). 
 235.  Silver v. Halifax Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 821 S.E.2d 755, 760 (N.C. 2018).  
 236. See id. at 756 (establishing that the state constitutional obligation to 
provide a sound, basic education belongs to the state, not a county board of 
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was similar to the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in 
Leandro v. North Carolina.237 In that case, the court ruled that its 
constitution imposed a duty on the state to provide every student 
with such a right.238 The Silver plaintiffs, unlike those in the 
Leandro case, claimed that the board maintained a tripartite 
school district system in an efficient manner that resulted in the 
defendants’ failure to provide the Black school districts in the 
county with a sound basic education.239 
In support of this claim, the plaintiffs compared the inputs and 
outputs provided to the two overwhelmingly Black districts—
Halifax County Public Schools (HCPS) and Weldon City Schools 
(WCS)—with those provided to the predominantly white district—
Roanoke Rapids Graded School District (RRGSD).240 With respect 
to inputs, the plaintiffs stated that school buildings were “woefully 
inadequate”; students in one high school had to “walk through 
sewage to move between classes because of defective plumbing”; 
and students frequently lacked textbooks and other curricular 
materials.241 In contrast, the facilities of the white school district 
were “well kept and regularly renovated.”242 Students also had 
access to advanced placement classes and other curricular and 
extra-curricular programs not available to the Black districts.243 
Because of these disparities, the plaintiffs asserted that it was 
 
commissioners). 
 237. See id. (determining the case is distinguishable from the landmark 
decision); see also Leandro v. North Carolina, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997) 
(holding that the right to education provided in the state constitution is 
qualitative and encompasses the right to sound basic education). 
 238. See Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255 (concluding the North Carolina 
Constitution guarantees every child of the state the opportunity to sound basic 
education, including a qualitatively adequate education). 
 239. See Silver, 821 S.E.2d at 757–58 (alleging the continued support of the 
system and refusal to manage and distribute resources efficiently among the 
districts resulted in failure). 
 240. See id. (showing HCPS’s student population as eighty-five percent Black 
and four percent white, WCS’s student population as ninety-four percent Black 
and four percent white, and RRGSD as twenty-six percent Black and sixty-five 
percent white). 
 241. Id. at 758. 
 242. Id.  
 243. See id. (discussing availability of a wide variety of activities for RRGSD 
students while HCPS and WCS teachers often rely on donations from parents to 
purchase books and classroom materials). 
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difficult for HPCS and WCS to attract and retain “quality, or even 
fully licensed, teachers and administrators.”244 Indeed, they 
frequently had to resort to hiring teachers from the Teach for 
America program or very inexperienced teachers.245 
According to the plaintiffs, these disparities were caused by 
the defendant’s system of local sales tax distribution for 
education.246 Legislation empowered county commissioners to 
choose between two methods of distributing local sales tax to 
provide additional funding to school districts.247 The first was the 
per capita method, which called for local sales tax revenue to be 
distributed to all municipalities based on the resident population 
of each.248 The second was the ad valorem method, in which local 
sales tax revenue is divided among all taxing entities.249 The board 
always chose the ad valorem method, which the plaintiffs alleged 
caused the white school district to receive more educational 
funding than their Black counterparts.250 As to outputs, the 
plaintiffs asserted that HCPS and WCS students scored 
substantially below RRGSD students on end-of-course tests and a 
majority of HCPS and WCS students scored below grade level on 
state standardized tests.251 Moreover, students from HCPS and 
WCS schools consistently scored 150 to 250 points lower on the 
SAT exam.252 
The Board moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that 
the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
 
 244. Id.  
 245. See id. (noting the percentage of fully licensed teachers in the two 
predominantly Black districts ranged from sixty-three to eighty-nine percent).  
 246. See id. (theorizing reasons for the discrepancy in the quality of education 
available). 
 247. See id. (discussing the General Assembly enacted legislation that gives 
the defendant the choice of two distribution options). 
 248. See id. (citing North Carolina General Statute § 105-472(b)(1)). 
 249. See id. (citing North Carolina General Statute § 105-472(b)(2)). 
 250. See id. (discussing how HCPS does not have supplemental property tax 
and is therefore not a taxing entity, receiving no money from the ad valorem 
method). 
 251. See id. (showing that students in HCPS and WCS schools score fifteen to 
thirty percent lower than RRGSD schools on tests).  
 252. See id. at 758–59 (discussing another statistic to show disparities within 
the school districts). 
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granted.253 The trial court granted this motion and the state court 
of appeals affirmed.254 The state supreme court upheld the lower 
courts’ ruling on the ground that the state, not the county board of 
commissioners, had the obligation to provide a sound basic 
education.255 
VI. Part V:  Reparations Framework for State Legislation 
Thus far, we explained how local property taxation, state aid 
policies, and stealth inequities have worked together to create 
Black-white disparities in school funding post-Brown.256 We also 
observed that the Supreme Court further encouraged this gap by 
(1) upholding the constitutionality of local property taxation in 
Rodriguez; (2) prohibiting the court-mandated desegregation of 
metropolitan areas in Milliken I; and (3) authorizing limited 
reparations plans for Black urban communities in Milliken II.257 
We have also observed that recent school finance litigation has 
begun to target policies that have caused racial funding 
disparities.258 This race-conscious school finance litigation 
promises to put a stop to policies that have caused Black-white 
school funding disparities.259 However, this litigation strategy does 
not provide a remedy for losses in school funding over the years 
and the funding gap experienced by predominantly Black schools 
and their communities.260 Can reparations litigation provide relief 
for this latter injury? 
 
 253. See id. at 759 (moving to dismiss the plaintiffs’ request of a declaratory 
judgement to order the implementation of a plan to cure alleged violations of 
fundamental rights to education). 
 254. See id. (noting that no provision of the North Carolina Constitution 
affirmatively requires a board of county commissioners to implement and 
maintain a public education system in the county in which it sits). 
 255. See id. at 760 (using the clear and unambiguous language of the state 
constitution to determine that no express provision requires boards of county 
commissioners to provide for or preserve any rights relating to education). 
 256. See supra Part II.  
 257.  See supra Part III. 
 258. See supra Part IV. 
 259. Id.  
 260. Id.  
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Probably not. Plaintiffs have made several attempts to obtain 
reparations through litigation.261 These attempts have been 
largely unsuccessful.262 Indeed, “reparations litigation has been all 
but abandoned.”263 According to Kindaka Jamal Sanders, standing 
poses a particularly formidable barrier to reparations-based 
litigation:  
The standing problem produces several challenges to 
reparations-related litigation. The first problem relates to 
individual claims of current injuries stemming from slavery. 
The standing doctrine requires that the injury alleged by the 
plaintiff be his own and not that of another. Thus, African 
Americans are prevented from maintaining a suit based 
exclusively on the enslavement of their ancestors. The harm to 
the plaintiff has to be personal. The standing doctrine has also 
been interpreted to limit claims of group injury or injuries 
deriving from stigmatization.264 
Because litigation provides an incomplete remedy for the 
damage caused to Black communities and the schools that serve 
them, reparations must be achieved through legislation, not 
litigation.265 Robert Westley explains the advantages of 
legislative-based reparations in the following passage:  
Legislatures, it may be argued, provide a friendlier forum for 
racial redress for both formal and substantive reasons. 
Formally, although their actions may be subject to judicial 
review, they are not constrained by judicial doctrines of 
standing, deference, timing or res judicata. Each of these 
doctrines might impact negatively any lawsuit seeking Black 
 
 261. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim, & Abigail M. Holden, 
American Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 
1, 22—23 (2007) (discussing how the case for reparations fit within 
well-established legal principals such as traditional tort law framework and 
contract claims). 
 262. See id. at 24 (stating that the “staccato failure” of recent lawsuits lends 
a sense that the use of tort and contract law were misfits in the reparations 
context). 
 263. Kindaka Jamal Sanders, Re-Assembling Osiris: Rule 23, the Black 
Farmers Case, and Reparations, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 339, 346 (2013).  
 264. Id. at 347.  
 265. See Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone:  Is it Time to Reconsider the 
Case for Black Reparations?, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429, 434–35 (1998) 
(considering the recent revival of the reparations principle through legislation 
aimed towards Holocaust survivors whose assets were illegally confiscated by 
Swiss banks in the aftermath of World War II). 
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reparations. The claim of reparations, although constructively 
taking the form of a traditional lawsuit, e.g., Victims of Racism 
v. The Government that Failed to Protect Them, inevitably 
presents issues, some of them political, that many courts would 
find difficult, if not impossible, to resolve. By contrast, 
legislatures may hold hearings, make findings, and pass 
resolutions or laws on any matter affecting the public interest 
and within the scope of constitutional power. Substantively, 
legislatures provide a friendlier forum than courts for racial 
remedies, even during periods of backlash, because of their 
ability to enact comprehensive solutions to diffuse social ills, 
such as racial discrimination, and the inherent susceptibility of 
legislators not only to constituent pressure but also to trading 
votes. Moreover, historically it has been legislatures, not courts, 
that have in fact initiated the most comprehensive remedies to 
racial subordination, Brown v. Board of Education and its 
progeny notwithstanding.266 
One can find further support for the benefits of 
legislative-based reparations in Virginia’s Brown v. Board of 
Education Scholarship Program (Brown Fund Act)267—which has 
been called the country’s first civil rights reparations program in 
the country.268 This legislation was enacted in response to the 
state’s program of massive resistance in the wake of the Brown 
case.269 At that time, the state passed several laws to circumvent 
desegregation including the creation of voucher programs that 
white students could use to attend segregated, private schools.270 
Pursuant to this authority, Prince Edward County closed its 
schools from 1959–1964 and provided vouchers for its white 
 
 266.  Id. at 435–36. 
 267. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-231.1–10 (2020).  
 268. See Ken Woodley, Virginia is Proof That Reparations for Slavery Can 
Work, WASH. POST (Jul. 19, 2019, 11:24 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/virginia-is-proof-that-reparations-for-
slavery-can-work/2019/07/19/11aceaaa-a25b-11e9-b732-
41a79c2551bf_story.html (quoting “civil rights icon” Julian Bond remarking on 
the passing) [perma.cc/3ZCV-V7KU]. 
 269. See Committee Information, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUC. SCHOLARSHIP 
COMM., http://brownscholarship.virginia.gov/committee.asp (discussing how 
refusal of Virginia public schools to desegregate led to legislative action) 
[perma.cc/2Y7N-CDGH]. 
 270. See Daniel Peter Kuehn, Accommodation Within the Broad Structure of 
Voluntary Society:  Buchanan and Nutter on School Segregation (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3308162 (discussing 
attempts to continue school segregation) [perma.cc/3QYQ-44UL]. 
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students to use for segregation academies.271 However, the county 
provided no educational opportunities for Black students during 
this period.272 The Supreme Court eventually found this county’s 
actions unconstitutional in Griffin v. County School Board of 
Prince Edward County,273 but the five-year closing of schools 
affected Black residents in ways “that still haunt them as adults,” 
such as the failure to obtain a high school diploma and the inability 
to pursue career goals.274 
The Brown Fund Act seeks to remedy this wrong by providing 
financial support to present-day Virginia residents who were 
enrolled in the state’s public schools between 1954 and 1964, in 
jurisdictions that closed their schools to avoid desegregation.275 
Specifically, eligible students could use the fund to help them 
obtain:  
[T]he adult high school diploma; a passing score on a high school 
equivalency examination approved by the Board of Education; 
College-Level Examination Program (CLEP) credit; career or 
technical education or training in an approved program at a 
comprehensive community college or at an accredited career 
and technical education postsecondary school in the 
Commonwealth; an undergraduate degree from an accredited 
associate-degree-granting or baccalaureate (i) private 
institution of higher education or (ii) public institution of higher 
education; a graduate degree at the masters or doctoral level; 
or a professional degree from an accredited baccalaureate 
 
 271. See Chris Ford, Stephenie Johnson, & Lisette Partelow, The Racist 
Origins of Private School Vouchers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 12, 2017, 11:59 
PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-
12/reports/2017/07/12/435629/racist-origins-private-school-vouchers/ (discussing 
the history of the voucher program) [perma.cc/7X6B-2PE5]. 
 272. See Leo Casey, When Privatization Means Segregation:  Setting the 
Record Straight on School Vouchers, DISSENT (Aug 9, 2017), 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/private-school-vouchers-racist-
history-milton-friedman-betsy-devos (examining the resistance of desegregating 
and lack of available educational opportunities for Black students) 
[perma.cc/L6KS-JSKY]. 
 273. See Griffin v. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964) 
(holding that closing the public schools of the county while contributing to the 
support of private segregated white schools denied Black school children equal 
protection of the laws). 
 274. Verna L. Williams, Reading, Writing, and Reparations:  Systemic Reform 
of Public Schools as a Matter of Justice, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 419, 441 (2006).  
 275. See VA. CODE ANN. § 30-231.1–10 (2020) (establishing financial support 
for those desegregation effected in the fifties and sixties). 
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private institution of higher education in the Commonwealth or 
baccalaureate public institution of higher education in the 
Commonwealth.276 
Since the statute’s passage, nearly 250 persons have received 
financial support ranging “from a 65-year-old man, locked out of 
school after first grade, who wanted to learn phonics and cursive 
writing, to some who have gone on to earn college and graduate 
degrees.”277 While providing monetary reparations to those 
persons who have suffered from massive resistance should be part 
of the effort of a state to redress its wrongs, such funding alone is 
insufficient to address the educational harms suffered by Black 
students and communities.278 Indeed, Verna Williams in her 
critique of the Brown Fund Act states:  “[I]n light of the state’s 
history of segregating tax dollars and funneling most public 
revenues to White schools, lawmakers should develop a system of 
school funding that ensures equitable funding for facilities and 
resources at all schools.”279 We would also add that Virginia and 
other states should include provisions designed to address the 
harm done to predominantly Black schools and the communities 
they serve.280 The remainder of this part lays out a framework for 
school finance reparations that state legislators could adopt and 
provides specific examples using state data.281 It concludes with a 
discussion of the constitutionality of the plan under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
A. Four-Part Reparations Framework 
The persistent effects of Black-white racial segregation and 
housing discrimination affect education systems and school 
finance specifically in numerous ways.282 Our reparations plan 
 
 276. Id.  
 277. Woodley, supra note 268. 
 278. See id. (discussing the ongoing need for the United States to address the 
harms of slavery). 
 279. Williams, supra note 274, at 472–73. 
 280. See id. at 472 (showing how reforming education would be difficult, but 
the right thing to do). 
 281. See infra A. Four-Part Reparations Framework.  
 282. See PHILLIP TEGELER & MICHAEL HILTON, DISRUPTING THE RECIPROCAL 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOUSING AND SCHOOL SEGREGATION 2 (2017) (showing 
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focuses on four specific effects of housing discrimination and 
financial remedies for those effects: 
1. Lost property tax revenues due to depressed values; 
2. Inequitable taxation in the form of higher tax rates adopted 
to offset revenue losses; 
3. School finance policies which capitalize on and/or reinforce 
historical disparities; 
4. Increased costs of achieving common outcome goals for 
children in the presence of racial isolation. 
First, restrictive covenants in deeds, redlining, racial bias in 
mortgage lending, all interconnected with federal and state 
housing policies, as laid out in Richard Rothstein’s Color of Law, 
have led to dramatic differences in accumulated real estate wealth 
and current residential property values of Black individuals and 
Black communities.283 Local public-school district boundaries, 
which define taxing jurisdictions for funding public schools, often 
serve as dividing lines between high value residential properties 
owned by whites, immediately adjacent to low value residential 
properties owned for generations by Blacks.284 These differences in 
the average values of residential properties between 
predominantly Black and predominantly white school districts 
lead to vastly different ability of those districts to raise revenues 
from property taxes.285 These differences result directly from 
decades of government endorsed and enabled racial segregation.286 
Racial restrictions were introduced into and maintained in deeds 
specifically to preserve the value of homes in white 
neighborhoods.287  
 
how housing discrimination and school policy are tied together). 
 283. See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 51 (documenting the history of 
racial disparity in the United States). 
 284. See Karin E. Kitchens, Dividing Lines:  The Role School District 
Boundaries Play in Spending Inequality for Public Education, 102 SOC. SCI. Q. 
468, 474 (2020) (highlighting the differences taxes cause in education). 
 285. See id. (explaining how higher priced property collects more revenue at 
a lower tax rate). 
 286. See id. at 488 (noting that districts are separated along racial lines).  
 287. See Colin Gordon, St. Louis Blues: The Urban Crisis in the Gateway City, 
33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 81, 85 (2013) (explaining how race restrictive deeds 
uphold segregation). 
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Other factors partially mitigate these disparities in local 
revenue raising capacity. One example occurs where affluent white 
neighborhoods and high value commercial shopping districts 
remain within the boundaries of the school district which serves a 
majority Black population.288 For example, Kansas City was forced 
to pay for its own desegregation remedies through a significant 
increase in local tax levy.289 Other major urban centers have 
similar advantages to the extent that significant tax abatements 
have not minimized the taxable values of commercial properties.290 
But more residential urban districts like Baltimore or Philadelphia 
and inner urban fringe neighborhoods relegated for Black 
homeowners lack these advantages. 
Some states, primarily southern states, operate countywide 
school systems which leads to fewer sharply racially divided taxing 
jurisdictions.291 But even then, in some of these states, Black cities 
and towns at the center of these counties are carved out as 
separate, segregated independent taxing jurisdictions.292 One 
notable example is Baltimore City.293 As such, the race gap in local 
property tax revenues varies widely from state to state and in some 
cases from region to region within states. 
State school finance systems typically include a general 
formula aid component of which a primary goal is equalization of 
revenues based on differences in local wealth and income—many 
 
 288. See Green & Baker, supra note 134, at 64 (showing how predominantly 
white shopping centers and country clubs increased the value of the entire school 
district). 
 289. See id. at 73 (keeping in place the court ordered tax levy). 
 290. See id. at 64 (showing the effect of high value residential and commercial 
properties on taxes). 
 291. See ILL. STATE UNIV. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF EDUC. POL’Y., COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS: RESEARCH AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 9 (ILL. STATE UNIV. 
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF EDUC. POL’Y, ed., 2009) (listing Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, and South Carolina as countywide school systems). 
 292. See Lionel Foster, “The Black Butterfly” Racial Segregation and 
Investment Patterns in Baltimore, URB. INST. (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://apps.urban.org/features/baltimore-investment-
flows/?fbclid=IwAR0uKWoIjA1JclJtceAQzGm6xl6-
Mv5vROchWRWy_gcCfq9N0sFuIyNml7Y (attributing the racial divide in cities 
and neighborhoods to the Federal Housing Administration) [perma.cc/2T83-
FYBP]. 
 293. See id. (calling Baltimore City the “black butterfly” due to the rampant 
segregation). 
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exclusively focused on differences in taxable property wealth.294 
That is: 
[State General Formula Aid = Foundation Funding Target – 
Local Revenue Raised at Equitable Taxation] 
The foundation funding target may either be a singular 
spending per pupil target, or may be adjusted to account for 
various need and cost factors.295 These latter, additional 
adjustments may either work in favor of, or in opposition to, 
driving additional resources to Black communities and children.296 
Whether including additional factors or not, general formula aid 
programs often fail to mitigate entirely Black-white disparities in 
school district revenues.297 Mitigating these disparities, now and 
henceforth (and perhaps retroactively) is part I of our reparations 
framework: 
Compensation for lost property tax revenues:  Upon calculating 
the Black-white difference in local revenues which arise from 
historical forces of real estate segregation, then adding the 
difference in state general formula aid (existing compensation), 
we can identify the remaining gap in revenues for the Black 
child and for the white child in any state. States should be 
required to allocate this additional margin of funding per Black 
child based on Black enrollments across all districts. 
As noted above, local tax revenues per Black child in many 
states are less than local tax revenues per white child because local 
property values are lower—even for otherwise similar structures—
in predominantly Black neighborhoods than in white 
neighborhoods.298 Often, however, the margin of difference in 
 
 294. See BRUCE D. BAKER. MATHEW DI CARLO, & MARK WEBER, THE ADEQUACY 
AND FAIRNESS OF STATE SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEMS 2 (2019), 
https://www.shankerinstitute.org/resource/adequacy-and-fairness-state-school-
finance-systems (introducing the generic school finance system formula) 
[perma.cc/FC8Q-STUK]. 
 295. See id. at 4 (highlighting the different factors that weigh in to cost of 
education in schools). 
 296. See id. at 3 (comparing two similar school districts and showing how 
inequality can arise). 
 297. See id. at 2 (using three core principles to create a new and more 
equitable system of school finance). 
 298. See ANDRE PERRY, JONATHAN ROTHWELL, & DAVID HARSHBARGER, THE 
DEVALUATION OF ASSETS IN BLACK NEIGHBORHOODS 11 (2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018.11_Brookings-
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revenue is less than it would be under equal taxation.299 Black 
communities and homeowners in many cases are paying a higher 
effective tax rate on their properties to raise less revenue than 
their white neighbors in the next district over.300 Save for another 
day the fact that Black homeowners are also likely paying 
significant additional fees and higher interest rates on their 
mortgages than even white homeowners in the same districts.301 
The assumption behind a general aid formula is that foundation 
spending levels should be attainable at equal taxation. 
Our first component offsets only the remaining gap in 
revenues to school districts without considering the possible 
differences in unequal taxation between Black and white 
homeowners.302 Our second component begins by calculating the 
average difference in effective tax rates paid by Black versus white 
homeowners and provides a rebate for the higher price in taxes 
paid by Black homeowners. 
Compensation for inequitable residential taxation:  Rebates to 
Black property taxpayers covering Black-white differential in 
effective tax rate. 
Structurally, this program is similar to state aid programs 
which have been used to buy down the tax rates for fixed or lower 
income households in affluent, high spending, high taxing school 
districts, like New York’s STAR tax relief program.303 The 
difference is that those programs in fact reinforce racial disparities 
 
Metro_Devaluation-Assets-Black-Neighborhoods_final.pdf (valuing homes in 
Black neighborhoods at roughly half of homes with no Black residents) 
[perma.cc/J952-UDC5]. 
 299. See BAKER, DI CARLO, & WEBER, supra note 294, at 16 (comparing the 
difference in revenue between two separate districts). 
 300. See Kitchens, supra note 284, at 6 (showing the difference in tax rates 
due to segregation). 
 301. See John Yinger, Discrimination in Mortgage Lending:  A Literature 
Review, in Mortgage Lending, Racial Discrimination and Federal Policy, in 
MORTGAGE LENDING, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AND FEDERAL POLICY 29 (John 
Goering & Ron Wienk eds., 1997) (highlighting the higher interest rates Black 
homeowners regularly face).  
 302. See BAKER, DI CARLO, & WEBER, supra note 294, at 17 (listing the 
differences in revenue for school systems between states).  
 303. See Tae Ho Eom & Kiernan Killeen, Reconciling State Aid for Property 
Tax Relief for Urban Schools:  Birthing a New STAR in New York State, 40 EDUC. 
& URB. SOC. 36, 43 (2007) (giving a brief overview of the STAR program). 
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and reward communities that have high property values due to 
past segregation.304 States have a variety of features of their aid 
programs which specifically reward districts by driving more aid, 
or providing more local revenue raising authority to those districts 
that have benefited historically from racial residential 
segregation.305 Perhaps the most obvious and egregious among 
these is Kansas’s policy of raising local revenue caps for the 
districts with the highest priced houses—districts that primarily 
serve the white suburbs of Kansas City—a region that was a 
national model for the use of Homeowners Associations (HoAs) as 
method of enforcing racial restrictions.306 That is, these districts 
are permitted to raise more revenue specifically because Black 
homeowners were (and still largely are) kept out.307 This brings us 
to our third component: 
Reversal of school finance and aid distribution policies built 
explicitly on prior, systemic racism and commensurate 
repayment to affected school districts. 
Revenues raised through these programs should be redistributed 
to neighboring districts serving large Black populations. 
The final component of our reparations plan is more 
complicated, and addressed in our prior work. The creation of 
Black racial isolation through restrictive housing policies led to a 
unique form of concentrated Black urban poverty which has had 
intergenerational adverse influence on short-term achievement 
and long-term economic outcomes for children raised in these 
communities.308 Bruce Baker and Preston Green have estimated in 
prior work the additional costs associated with achieving outcome 
equity in racially isolated Black communities.309 States should be 
 
 304. See id. (outlining the issues with the STAR program). 
 305. Baker & Corcoran, supra note 78 (rewarding districts for having a 
history of racial segregation).  
 306. Gordon, supra note 287 (showing how race restrictive deeds uphold 
segregation).  
 307. Id. (explaining how race restrictive deeds keep Black property values 
down). 
 308. See Bruce D. Baker, Exploring the Sensitivity of Education Costs to 
Racial Composition of Schools and Race-Neutral Alternative Measures, 86 
PEABODY J. EDUC. 58, 73 (2011) (displaying a table showing the adverse effect of 
poverty on achievement). 
 309. See generally Bruce D. Baker & Preston C. Green III, Equal Educational 
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obligated to include in their cost adjustments for funding formulas, 
a factor that compensates for the additional costs of remedying 
outcomes for students in racially isolated, Black school districts. 
B. Examples 
1. Lost Property Tax Revenues Due to Depressed Values 
For the first component, the first step is to calculate the local 
revenue per white child in a state and local revenue per Black child 
in a state, to determine the magnitude of the gap, if any, between 
the two. 
[Local Revenue per White Child - Local Revenue per Black 
Child = Local Revenue Gap] 
The second step is to calculate the extent to which state general 
formula aid compensates for this gap and whether a remaining 
racial gap is left after including state general formula aid. Table 1 
provides a summary of the past decade for three states with 
persistent remaining racial gaps. In Maryland, the average local 
revenue per Black child is over $2,000 less per pupil in most years 
than the average local revenue per white child.310 But the average 
state general formula aid is less than $1,000 more per Black child 
than per white child, covering less than half the gap and leaving a 
reparations margin of nearly $1,500 per pupil.311 To a large extent, 
the Maryland gap is a function of the separation of Baltimore City 
from the county governance structure.312 Gaps are also persistent 
in Virginia, a state where a number of majority Black “city” 
districts are carved out from county systems. 
Connecticut remains one of the most segregated northeastern 
states, and a state that has put less effort into providing school 
 
Opportunity and the Distribution of Educational Opportunity and the 
Distribution of State Aid to Schools:  Can or Should School Racial Composition 
Be a Factor?, 34 J. EDUC. FIN 289 (2009). 
 310. See infra Table 1. States with Large Persistent Black-White Revenue Gaps 
(showing the local revenue gap to be $2,173). 
 311. See id (showing the margin to be $1,497). 
 312. FOSTER, supra note 292. 
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funding equity than others.313 The local revenue gap for the 
average Black versus white child in Connecticut is huge.314 While 
the state general formula aid margin is larger in Connecticut than 
in Virginia or Maryland, the remaining reparations margin in 
Connecticut in recent years is the largest. 
Table 1. States with Large Persistent Black-White Revenue 
Gaps315 
 State General Formula Aid DIF 
(BLACK – WHITE) 
Local Property Tax 
Revenue GAP 





2008 $1,118 $2,809 $1,821 
2009 $853 $2,609 $1,821 
2010 $805 $2,471 $1,722 
2011 $608 $2,293 $1,791 
2012 $649 $1,970 $1,408 
2013 $774 $1,700 $987 
2014 $648 $2,034 $1,475 
2015 $711 $2,373 $1,730 
2016 $708 $1,907 $1,232 
2017 $733 $2,022 $1,324 
2018 $710 $2,173 $1,497 
Virginia 
2008 $475 $1,442 $1,041 
2009 $526 $1,348 $852 
2010 $442 $1,387 $977 
2011 $284 $1,210 $984 
2012 $312 $1,187 $933 
2013 $266 $1,261 $1,061 
2014 $272 $1,281 $1,074 
2015 $288 $1,268 $1,021 
2016 $279 $1,255 $1,003 
2017 $300 $1,257 $982 
 
 313. See GARY ORFIELD & JONGYEON EE, CONNECTICUT SCHOOL INTEGRATION 
MOVING FORWARD AS THE NORTHEAST RETREATS 31 (2015) (showing severe 
segregation in schools). 
 314. See id. at 13 (highlighting the extreme difference in communities’ 
wealth). 
 315. Data Sources:  Compiled by author using school district level panel, from:  
Bruce D. Baker, Matthew Di Carlo, Ajay Srikanth, & Mark Weber, SCHOOL 
FINANCE INDICATORS DATABASE (2020), http://schoolfinancedata.org/ 
[perma.cc/5HHX-MAAS]. 
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2018 $300 $1,294 $1,016 
Connecticut 
2008 $2,624 $3,168 $586 
2009 $2,796 $3,034 $247 
2010 $2,435 $3,071 $658 
2011 $2,370 $3,365 $1,058 
2012 $2,775 $3,390 $656 
2013 $2,645 $3,732 $1,160 
2014 $2,568 $3,941 $1,461 
2015 $2,470 $4,108 $1,707 
2016 $2,508 $4,015 $1,549 
2017 $2,557 $4,319 $1,808 
2018 $2,756 $4,295 $1,574 
 
Revenue variables derived from U.S. Census Fiscal Survey of Local 
Governments, where local revenue includes revenue from school 
district local property taxes and local revenue from city, parent 
government property taxes. State aid includes only state general 
formula aid. Racial composition from National Center for 
Education Statistics Common Core of Data, Public Education 
Agency Universe Survey. 
2. Inequitable Taxation in the Form of Higher Tax Rates Adopted 
to Offset Revenue Losses 
Table 1 reveals the extent of local revenue gaps in Maryland, 
Virginia and Connecticut. These three states were found to have 
the largest persistent gaps among states with significant Black 
populations.316 In Connecticut, for example, the average local 
revenue per Black child is over $4,000 per pupil less than the 
average local revenue per white child.317 In many cases, Black 
homeowners are paying even higher effective tax rates on their 
homes than white homeowners just to get the gaps this small.318 
The revenue gaps would be larger at equitable taxation.319 Blacks 
are paying a tax penalty in addition to facing a revenue deficit, 
 
 316. See supra Table 1. States with Large Persistent Black-White Revenue 
Gaps. 
 317. See id. (showing the average gap in revenue between white and Black 
children is $4,925). 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
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because of housing segregation.320 Black communities may also 
face other elevated costs related to maintenance of aging 
infrastructure and public safety, leading to higher cumulative 
property taxes. 
Table 2 summarizes data on housing values and property 
taxes paid, calculated with individual household level data for 
Black and white households in the American Community Survey 
from 2005 to 2018.321 Data are by metropolitan area, including 
metro areas within the states addressed in Table 1. In the 
Baltimore metro area Black homes are, on average, valued at 
about $150,000 less than white homes.322 Property taxes paid on 
Black homes tend to be about $1,000 less, but this still leads to a 
higher effective tax rate.323 One might calculate the average 
“reparations rebate” payment to Black households as the 
difference in the tax bill that would be paid on the Black home if 
the white effective tax rate was used.324 For example, in Bridgeport 
for a home valued at $340,000: 
Black Tax Rate – White Tax Rate = .53% 
.53% × $340k = $1,802 
Black Tax  Black Home 
Value 
 Black Homeowner 
Rebate 
Similarly, in Baltimore on a $240,000 home, a $1,080 rebate (.45% 
rebate). 
Table 2. Black Tax by Metropolitan Area325 







 320. Id. 
 321. See infra Table 2. Black Tax by Metropolitan Area (displaying the 
property taxes paid in Black and white households). 
 322. See id. (showing the difference in home values to be $154,010). 
 323. See id. (showing the difference in property taxes to be $1,004). 
 324. Id. 
 325. Data Source:  Calculated using American Community Survey annual 
samples from 2005–2018 from Steven Ruggles, Sarah Flood, Ronald Goeken, 
Josiah Grover, Erin Meyer, Jose Pacas, & Matthew Sobek, IPUMS USA:  Version 
10.0, IPUMS (2020), https://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V10.0 [perma.cc/K4WK-
FH2K]. 
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Baltimore-Columbia-
Towson, MD 
White $391,996 $3,557 1.41% 
Black $237,986 $2,553 1.86% 
Bridgeport-Stamford-
Norwalk, CT 
White $735,471 $7,310 2.00% 
Black $339,384 $5,546 2.53% 
Hartford-West Hartford-
East Hartford, CT 
White $307,296 $5,395 2.30% 
Black $224,367 $4,226 2.70% 
New Haven-Milford, CT White $322,175 $5,515 2.35% 
Black $221,543 $4,792 3.20% 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-
Newport News, VA-NC 
White $317,542 $2,630 1.23% 
Black $226,616 $1,965 1.37% 
Richmond, VA White $303,926 $2,391 1.13% 
Black $197,754 $1,631 1.23% 
Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 
White $539,631 $4,603 1.29% 
Black $400,178 $3,449 1.40% 
 
Table 3 shows that even if we control for housing unit size, by 
number of bedrooms, year of data, and metropolitan area within 
state, housing values for Black families in Connecticut and 
Maryland are over $140k less than housing values for white 
families.326 Total tax bills are lower, but effective tax rates still 
higher. These margins, however, are smaller than in Table 2 and 
would lead to smaller rebates. However, it is questionable as to 
whether such a policy should discount the rebate for the fact that 




 326. See infra 
 
Table 3. Conditional Analysis of Housing Value, Taxes and Tax Rate Differences 
(compiling the housing value, property taxes and effective rate of several cities). 
 327. Id. 
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Table 3. Conditional Analysis of Housing Value, Taxes and Tax 
Rate Differences 
2005–2018 
 Housing Value* Taxes Effective Rate 
 coef se coef se coef se 
Connecticut -$173,247 $2,887 
-
$1,096 $15 0.449% 0.084% 
Maryland -
$143,982 
$938 -$737 $6 0.297% 0.033% 
Virginia -$93,721 $847 -$682 $6 0.076% 0.032% 
*Controlling for year, no. of 
bedrooms and metro area     
3. School Finance Policies Which Capitalize on and/or Reinforce 
Historical Disparities 
The third component of school finance reparations requires 
more detailed auditing of state aid programs. Bruce Baker and 
Preston Green wrote back in 2005 about how states have created 
features of their state school finance systems which reinforce racial 
disparities.328 Specific examples included an Alabama provision 
which determined aid based on the degree levels held by teachers, 
which had been built on a previous program based on lower unit 
costs for Black versus white teachers.329 The former largely 
reinforced the latter when the shift was made because Black 
teachers, generally in Black schools had not been provided 
opportunities to seek higher degrees at the same rate as white 
teachers.330 Another example involved an adjustment to local 
revenue caps adopted in Kansas, called a “cost of living” 
adjustment, which increased the cap, by providing additional 
“weighted pupil” counts in the formula, for the seventeen districts 
with the highest housing prices.  
 
 328. See generally Bruce D. Baker & Preston C. Green III, Tricks of the Trade:  
State Legislative Actions in School Finance Policy That Perpetuate Racial 
Disparities in the Post-Brown Era, 111 AM. J. EDUC. 372 (2005).  
 329. See id. at 384 (summarizing the disparity in teachers’ pay because of 
their education level). 
 330. See id. (indicating that black teachers are 59% less likely to hold master’s 
degrees). 
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These programs capitalize on racial segregation, from de jure 
school segregation in Alabama, to carefully orchestrated racial 
residential segregation in Johnson and Wyandotte County 
Kansas.331 Put bluntly, the reason why homes in some districts in 
Kansas are valued higher than homes in neighboring districts is 
because of racial restrictions enforced through HOAs.332 Further, 
there is no justification that these policies represent any real needs 
or costs.333 As the Kansas courts explained:  
We held that the new cost-of-living property tax provision was 
not based on any evidence that there was any link between high 
housing costs and higher education costs or that the 17 districts 
that would benefit from the provision pay higher teacher 
salaries. We noted that the evidence at trial demonstrated the 
opposite—that the districts with high-poverty, high at-risk 
student populations are the ones that need help attracting and 
retaining teachers.334 
But because the adjustment was added while the case was already 
at the appellate court, it was allowed to remain as part of the 
funding formula and persists to this day.335 Moving forward, and 
perhaps even retroactively, these revenues should be shared across 
districts that were inappropriately advantaged and those that 
were adversely affected. 
Table 4 shows the effect of the Kansas “cost of living” 
adjustment across Johnson and Wyandotte County school 
districts. The policy adds “weighted pupils” to calculate a higher 
general funding level, and in turn raises the cap on additional 
(supplemental) local revenue raising.336 For Johnson County 
districts like Blue Valley, Shawnee Mission and Olathe that 
amounts to a seven percent or more increase.337 Kansas City, 
Kansas, where Blacks were relegated to homeownership, which 
remains twenty-seven percent Black (and majority Hispanic) 
 
 331. See id. at 388 (explaining the segregation practices in Kansas). 
 332. Gordon, supra note 287.  
 333. See Montoy v. Kansas, 138 P.3d 755, 758 (Kan. 2006) (noting high 
poverty students need help). 
 334. Id.  
 335. See Baker & Green, supra note 328, at 404 (outlining the court’s 
reasoning). 
 336. Infra Table 4. Effects of Kansas “Cost of Living” Adjustment. 
 337. See id. (showing the percentage increases to be 7.07%, 7.79% and 6.71%). 
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receives no adjustment despite sharing a boundary with Shawnee 
Mission. 
Table 4. Effects of Kansas “Cost of Living” Adjustment 













Johnson Blue Valley  3% 22,329  1,579  7.07% $314 
Johnson Spring Hill  
 3,073  - 0.00% $0 
Johnson Gardner Edgerton  4% 5,889  134  2.28% $101 
Johnson De Soto  3% 7,263  464  6.39% $283 















17% 2,314   116  5.00% $222 
Wyandotte Bonner Springs  11% 2,608  - 0.00% $0 
Wyandotte Kansas City  27% 21,422  - 0.00% $0 
KSDE 2020 General Fund and Legal Max & NCES Common Core Public 
School Universe Survey 
4. Increased Costs of Achieving Common Outcome Goals for 
Children in the Presence of Racial Isolation 
Finally, we have explained in prior work that the costs of 
achieving common outcome goals is influenced by racial isolation. 
Costs of achieving common outcome goals are influenced by a 
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variety of well understood factors including: child poverty 
concentrations, shares of children for whom English is a second 
language, shares of children with disabilities, regional differences 
in wages needed to recruit and retain teachers of comparable 
qualifications and other factors like district size and geographic 
location.338 These factors are commonly accounted for in state 
school finance systems, toward the goal of providing more equal 
educational opportunity for children to achieve common outcomes.  
We explored in a series of articles whether racial 
composition—specifically Black racial isolation—has independent 
effects on these costs that cannot be captured by race-neutral 
alternatives.339 Table 5 shows select findings from a 2011 article 
on this topic, using data from the state of Missouri from 2006–
2008. Table 4 focuses specifically on racially isolated inner urban 
fringe districts around Saint Louis and Kansas City. If we estimate 
costs of achieving equal opportunity using only the usual cost 
factors, for example, Wellston (a district since dissolved) which was 
100 percent Black at the time, would have a cost index of 1.099.340 
That is, if the state average per pupil cost is assigned a 1.0, 
Wellston’s costs are estimated to be about ten percent higher than 
state average. But, if we consider our race-neutral alternative 
measure which interacts child poverty with population density (a 
feature of racially isolated Black districts), we find that Wellston’s 
costs of equal opportunity rise to 43.6% above state average.341 
That is, if the state of Missouri intends to give children across 
districts equal opportunity to succeed on the measured outcome 
metrics, the state would need to provide Wellston 43.6% more than 
average funding.342 But, if we consider race directly in the 
equation, that margin increases to sixty-four percent above state 
 
 338. BRUCE D. BAKER, EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY AND SCHOOL FINANCE:  WHY 
MONEY MATTERS FOR AMERICA’S STUDENTS (2018).  
 339. Baker, supra note 308; Preston C. Green, Bruce D. Baker, & Joseph 
Oluwole, Race-conscious Funding Strategies and School Finance Litigation, 16 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39, 61 (2006); Baker & Green, supra note 309. 
 340. See infra Table 5. Select Missouri School District Cost Estimates from 
Baker, 2011 (based on modeled data from 2006–2008) (displaying a 1.099 cost 
index). 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
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average cost.343 We argued then and reiterate now that states must 
be obligated to address these cost differences through their aid 
formulas. These corrections are past due and race neutral 
alternatives are insufficient. 
Government endorsed and enabled policies of housing 
segregation, led to intergenerational economic deprivation of Black 
families in these metropolitan areas. As a result, we are now faced 
with the increased costs of mitigating outcome disparities in the 
presence of racial isolation.344 Federal courts shrugged off outcome 
equity as a reasonable metric for evaluating desegregation 
remedies in the 1990s, specifically regarding Kansas City.345 Here, 
as in our previous work, we provide the basis for allocating 
race-based differential funding to enable greater outcome 
equity.346 Without taking this final step, the reparations 
framework laid out herein would be incomplete.  
Table 5. Select Missouri School District Cost Estimates from 






















Wellston* 100 1.099 1.436 1.640 
Normandy 98.8 1.016 1.307 1.460 
Jennings 98.7 1.054 1.525 1.501 
Riverview Gardens 96.7 1.018 1.293 1.453 
Ferguson-Florissant 77.2 1.003 1.099 1.312 
Kansas 
City 
Hickman Mills 79.2 .996 1.036 1.318 
Grandview 58.8 .977 .961 1.177 
Center 64.7 .998 .979 1.231 
 
 343. Id. 
 344. FOSTER, supra note 292. 
 345. See generally Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 346. Green, Baker & Oluwole, supra note 339. 
 347. See Bruce D. Baker, Exploring the Sensitivity of Education Costs to 
Racial Composition of Schools and Race-Neutral Alternative Measures, 86 
PEABODY J. EDUC. 58, 73 (2011) (displaying a table showing the adverse effect of 
poverty on achievement); Data source: From Table 7, page 48. 
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*The Wellston district was merged with Normandy in 2010. 
C. Equal Protection Clause Challenges 
Plaintiffs from other racial and ethnic minority groups may 
challenge our proposed reparations plan on equal protection 
grounds because they were also harmed by the state government’s 
racially discriminatory policies.348 Carlton Waterhouse reasons 
that courts will reject these claims as long as states provide 
particularized findings of their acts of racial discrimination 
specifically against Blacks.349 “Rather than random or particular 
instances,” he continues, “findings should go to systematic 
exclusions or discrimination practices carried out, authorized, or 
sanctioned by . . . state governments.”350 
White plaintiffs may also challenge our proposed plan on equal 
protection grounds.351 Such challenges pose a greater threat than 
the ones brought by other racial minority and ethnic groups 
because they go “to legislative authority to institute a reparations 
program rather than legislative discretion to choose which victims 
of past governmental discrimination will be its beneficiaries.”352 
Because our reparations plan employs a racial classification, these 
components would be subject to strict scrutiny.353 As such, they 
would have to be narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling 
governmental interest.354 
The Supreme Court has recognized that state governments 
have a compelling interest in eliminating the effects of past 
 
 348. See Carlton Waterhouse, Follow the Yellow Brick Road:  Perusing the 
Path to Constitutionally Permissible Reparations for Slavery and Jim Crow Era 
Governmental Discrimination, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 163, 170 (2009) (showing how 
equal protection is a grounds to challenge government policy). 
 349. See id. at 171 (dispensing claims so long as particular consideration is 
given to Blacks). 
 350. Id.  
 351. See id. (allowing for white plaintiffs to challenge under the reparations 
plan). 
 352. Id.  
 353. See id. at 172 (explaining the different levels of scrutiny appellate courts 
employ).  
 354. Id.  
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discrimination.355 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson356 provides 
guidance for how state programs can satisfy this interest.357 In this 
case, the Supreme Court invalidated Richmond, Virginia’s 
set-aside program which required prime contractors to award 
thirty percent of the dollar amount of each contract to one or more 
minority business enterprises (MBEs).358 Minority groups 
consisted of “Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, 
Eskimos, or Aleuts.”359 The Court rejected the claim that the 
set-aside program was designed to eliminate the present effects of 
past discrimination because: 
There is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against 
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons 
in any aspect of the Richmond construction industry. . . . It may 
well be that Richmond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo 
citizen. The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a 
practical matter, may never have suffered from discrimination 
in the construction industry in Richmond suggests that perhaps 
the city’s purpose was not in fact to remedy past 
discrimination.360 
Thus, Croson shows that states must provide particularized 
findings showing how its actions have led to the Black-white school 
funding disparities laid out in our reparations plan. 
With respect to the narrow tailoring prong, courts will 
examine a variety of factors including, “the efficacy of alternative 
remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief . . . ; and the 
impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.”361 Three 
components pose little problem for narrow analysis:  
 
 355. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (allowing states to 
remedy past discrimination); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (same); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson. Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (same).  
 356. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (holding that 
Richmond violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 357. See generally id. 
 358. See id. at 469 (requiring contractors to award thirty percent of the 
contracts to minorities). 
 359. Id. at 487.  
 360. Id. at 506. 
 361. See U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (finding that the order of 
a one-for-one promotion of corporals was narrowly tailored to serve the states 
compelling purposes).  
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(a) Compensation to school districts for lost property revenues; 
(b) tax rebates to Black taxpayers; and (c) increased funding to 
racially isolated school districts.362 Under the narrow-tailoring 
prong, there are no better ways to remedy these issues.363 In fact, 
ostensibly race-neutral policies caused these problems in the first 
place.364 Furthermore, these remedies do not impact the rights of 
residents and taxpayers living in other school districts.365 These 
remedies merely place Black taxpayers and predominantly Black 
school districts on equal footing with their white counterparts.  
Conversely, the component calling for redistribution of aid 
distribution policies built on systemic racism might pose a 
narrow-tailoring problem.366 Residents from predominantly white 
school districts could assert that the loss of funding would have a 
negative impact on them.367 A state could counter this assertion 
with education cost studies showing that this redistribution of 
funds would not affect these districts’ ability to provide their 
students an adequate education as required by their state 
education clauses.368 
 
 362. Cf. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 507-08 (presenting two reasons why the 
plan in this case was not narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination: there 
was no consideration of the use of race-neutral means and the goal was not 
narrowly tailored to remedy the prior discrimination). 
 363. See id. at 507 (stating that the City in this case had not considered any 
alternative to their proposed plan which means it did not pass the 
narrow-tailoring analysis).  
 364. See id. at 505 (noting that nothing was presented that “clearly identified 
and unquestionably” legitimized the scope of injury to minority contractors in this 
case which called for necessary remedy). 
 365. See id. at 494 (explaining that classifications based on race must be 
strictly reserved for remedial settings). 
 366. See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III, Harrowing Through 
Narrow Tailoring: Voluntary Race-Conscious Student-Assignment Plans, Parents 
Involved and Fisher, 14 WYO. L. REV. 705, 710 (2014) (highlighting how 
narrow-tailoring analysis requires “evidence that the legislature observed and 
intended to remedy lingering discriminatory impacts within the particular 
institution affected by the remedial measure”). 
 367. See id. at 715 (explaining how diversity passing constitutional muster is 
not “simple ethnic diversity,” such as racial set asides or quotas).  
 368. See Hugh Baran, In Croson’s Wake: Affirmative Action, Local Hiring, and 
Struggle to Diversify America’s Building & Construction Trades, 39 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 299, 341 (2018) (noting how courts have consistently rejected 
programs without any statistical studies); see also Baker & Green, supra note 309 
(discussing of the use of cost studies). 
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VII. Part VI:  Federal Role 
The federal government must also play a role in any 
reparations program that addresses Black-white school funding 
disparities. We take this stance in part because of the federal 
government’s role in creating these enduring gaps, which we 
explained earlier in this Article.369 It is also worth noting that 
Congress has provided reparations to other racial groups to atone 
for wrongdoing.370 For instance, Congress authorized reparation 
payments to Native American tribes in 1946 for land taken from 
them.371 Then, in 1971, through the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act, Congress created a trust fund that distributed 
resource extraction profits.372 Additionally, Congress allocated 
$462.5 million from the general treasury fund for Native 
Americans.373 In 1948, Congress passed the American Japanese 
Evacuation Claims Act designed to partially pay Japanese 
Americans for loss of property during internment.374 A mere total 
of $100,000 was allocated and claimants had to prove loss of 
 
 369.  See infra Parts I and II. 
 370. See Adeel Hassan & Jack Healy, America has Tried Reparations Before. 
Here is How it Went., N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/us/reparations-slavery.html (explaining 
Acts where the United States paid reparations to Native Americans and 
Japanese-American survivors of internment) [perma.cc/U6Q2-EPJY]. 
 371. See Michael Conklin, An Uphill Battle for Reparationists:  A Quantitative 
Analysis of the Effectiveness of Slavery Reparations Rhetoric, 10 COLUM. J. RACE 
& L. 33, 39 (2020) (noting that in the past 100 years the payment of reparations 
has diversified from the past when payments were largely limited to instances of 
the losing state in a war agreeing to make payments to the victor and now it is a 
form of remedy for mistreatment). 
 372. See Ryan Fortson, Models of Reparations for Slavery:  Correcting the 
Harms of Slavery:  Collective Liability, The Limited Prospects of Success for a 
Class Action Suit for Slavery Reparations, and the Reconceptualization of White 
Racial Identity, 6 AFR. AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 71, 107 (2004) (highlighting that there 
are many times in history that Congress has provided some sort of restitution to 
Native Americans).  
 373. See id. at 107 (explaining that this was specifically meant to be 
distributed amongst Native Alaskan tribes). 
 374. Westley, supra note 266, at 450–51 (listing indignities and losses 
suffered by the Japanese Americans due to internment); For a great discussion of 
the Japanese-American reparations, see generally Dale Minami, Lessons from 
Other Reparations Movements:  Japanese-American Redress, 6 AFR. AM. L. & 
POL’Y REP 27 (2004); Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the 
Seventh Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 83–84 (2008). 
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property and that the loss happened as a natural result of the 
evacuation for internment.375 Additionally, it required claimants to 
give up their rights to any future evacuation-related claims against 
the federal government.376 In 1988, Congress, in partnership with 
President Reagan, passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 which 
appropriated $20,000 per person reparation payments to 
Japanese-Americans for internment during World War II.377 Ryan 
Fortson points out that “the reparations awarded to those interned 
was not the result of a lawsuit but rather occurred by Congress 
directly appropriating funds for that purpose.”378 As Robert 
Westley notes, “the importance of the legislation lies in the 
precedent established for compensation of wronged groups within 
the American system.”379 However, Dale Minami notes that the 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988 “limited redress to those Americans of 
Japanese ancestry who were alive on the date of the signing, a 
requirement inserted for a reason—to avoid a ‘precedent’ for 
African Americans.”380 Blacks advocated for the 
 
 375. Westley, supra note 266, at 450 (noting that this piece of legislation is 
the “only official attempt by Congress to compensate Japanese American property 
losses for over forty years”). 
 376. Id. at 450–51 (highlighting another flaw in the legislation was that 
compensation was only provided once loss of property could be proved by records). 
 377. Fortson, supra note 372, at 92 (noting that the reparations were paid to 
roughly 60,000 survivors). The reparations payments amounted to anywhere 
between $1.2 billion and $1.6 billion. Id. at 92; Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual 
and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 
499–500 (2003). For more on the Japanese-American reparations and the Civil 
Liberties Act of 1988, see Chad W. Bryan, Precedent for Reparations? A Look at 
Historical Movement for Redress and Where Awarding Reparations for Slavery 
Might Fit, 54 ALA. L. REV. 599, 601–03 (2003); Mishael A. Danielson & Alexis 
Pimentel, Give Them Their Due:  An African-American Reparations Program 
Based on the Native American Federal Aid Model, 10 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC 
ANC. L. J. 89, 103–05 (2004). 
 378. Fortson, supra note 372, at 108; see Abigail M. Holden, Sandra Hye Yun 
Kim, & Erik K. Yamamoto, American Reparations Theory and Practice at the 
Crossroads, 44 CAL. W.L. REV. 1, 75–76 (2007) (showcasing an example of 
reparations was the Public Health Services payments to 399 Black men who were 
experimented on like laboratory rats in study of late-stage syphilis. These men 
were allowed to die a slow death rather than getting penicillin to treat the disease. 
Twenty-eight of the men died from syphilis and 100 from complications).  
 379. Westley, supra note 266, at 451.  
 380. Dale Minami, Lessons from Other Reparations Movements:  
Japanese-American Redress, 6 AFR. AM. L. & POL’Y REP 27, 33 (2004). 
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Japanese-American reparations.381 In fact, “we saw solidarity 
among members of Congress.382 The Japanese-American 
contingent, and all of the Latino and Black caucuses supported 
Japanese-American redress, giving the issue weight and moral 
authority.”383 
In contrast, Congress has taken limited actions to address the 
harm that slavery, Jim Crow, and other forms of discrimination 
has inflicted upon the Black community.384 In 1865, during the 
Civil War, General Sherman’s Field Order No. 15 called for 
redistribution of forty acres of land and a mule to each freedman.385 
 
 381. See id. at 33 (highlighting how “other Asian Americans, Jewish 
Americans, other people of color, and white Americans all came together and 
lobbied on behalf of Japanese Americans”). 
 382. Id. at 34. 
 383. See id. at 33 (“Other Asian Americans, Jewish Americans, African 
Americans, other people of color, and white Americans all came together and 
lobbied on behalf of Japanese Americans.”). Japanese-American civil rights 
attorney Dale Minami calls for unity with African-American reparations efforts: 
 
Many in our community never thought this Redress Bill would ever 
pass. Many of us were skeptical, but thought we should take this 
journey anyway because the journey was as important as the 
destination. We needed to attempt to make America live up to its own 
rhetoric of equal liberty, equal rights, and stand the test of truth and 
time. We felt that it was important, whether we won redress or not, to 
take the journey. Whether we won redress or not, we believed our 
efforts would educate the American public. And for that victory alone, 
it is incumbent on all of us to continue these efforts to educate—for all 
of us to take this journey for African-American redress. Id. at 34. 
 
 384. See Holden, supra note 378, at 85 (explaining that the Senate, as well as 
Virginia, did put forth an apology for inaction in the face of widespread Jim Crow 
lynching).  
 385. See Adjoa Aiyetoro, Achieving Reparations While Respecting Our 
Differences:  A Model for Black Reparations, 63 HOW. L.J. 329, 336 (2020) (noting 
how this land was not a gift, and that the receivers had to pay rent for the first 
three years, then required payment of the value of the land to purchase); Emma 
Coleman Jordan, The Importance of Slavery Reparations:  The Non-Monetary 
Value of Reparations Rhetoric, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 21, 24 (2004) (“The 
forty acres and a mule that General Sherman promised to the slaves was the 
beginning of the idea of reparations in America, but not the end.”); Danielson & 
Pimentel, supra note 377, at 103 (noting that, as with all the reprehensible 
injustices against slaves, the mules for this reparation were “animals too weak 
for military service”); David C. Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to Transitional 
Justice:  Reparations as Tools of Extraordinary Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1043, 
1049 (2010) (explaining how in the end, the promise ended up being a mere 
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Congress then worked with President Abraham Lincoln to enact 
the Freedmen’s Bureau Act.386 The Freedmen’s Bureau Act 
established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned 
Lands (Freedmen’s Bureau) to rent out the forty acres to freedmen 
for three years with a possibility of purchase.387 Sadly, the 
distribution was not equitable but rather based on whom the 
federal government considered loyal and deserving.388 Moreover, 
the Bureau’s funding was cut and the lands reverted to 
slaveowners as President Andrew Johnson pardoned 
ex-Confederates and returned land to them.389 The Freedmen’s 
Bureau Act  had a relatively nominal impact on education 
compared to the need: 
Under the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, Congress provided 
 
nominal empty promise as the reparations were not justly paid); Patricia M. 
Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade:  A Legacy Establishing a Case for 
International Reparations, 3 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 147, 199 (2013) (highlighting 
how the empty promises impacted more than the generation which they were 
denied to because it also “deprived historic victims of lawful property” who should 
have inherited such estates). 
 386. See Aiyetoro, supra note 385, at 336 (explaining that the first bill was 
vetoed by President Johnson, but after modifying the bill, it passed in 1866); 
Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door:  Examining the 
Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 
685–86 (1999) (stating that the final bill authorized Congress’s appropriation of 
funds to purchase school buildings for refugees and freedmen, and to empower 
the President to “reserve up to three million acres of “good” public land . . . .”). 
 387. See Aiyetoro, supra note 385, at 336 (noting that the land was not a gift, 
and that the government charged rent for the land for the first three years with 
the option to purchase).  
 388. See Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door:  
Examining the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. 
PA. L. REV. 677, 686 (1999) (indicating that the act was only authorized for two 
years). 
 389. See Westley, supra note 266, at 460 (highlighting that the freedmen and 
refugee’s hope of buying this land from the federal government also evaporated 
with this action); Zachary F. Bookman, A Role for Courts in Reparations, 20 NAT’L 
BLACK L.J. 75, 101 n.148 (2007) (explaining that President Johnson revoked 
General Sherman’s order to distribute 40 acres to free black families); Maxine 
Burkett, Reconciliation and Nonrepetition:  A New Paradigm for 
African-American Reparations, 86 OR. L. REV. 99, 107–08 (2007) (noting how 
Sherman’s order was in alignment with President Lincoln's belief that 
emancipated slaves needed land as an economic base for their advancement); 
Danielson & Pimentel, supra note 377, at 100 (expounding on the fact that 
General Sherman had the support of the War Department when he made the 
original land grants). 
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$ 500,000 for rent and repair of school and asylum buildings, 
and decided that the Bureau might “seize, hold, lease or sell for 
school purposes” any property of the ex-Confederate States. To 
meet the need for permanent schools, the Bureau in most states 
paid for completion of buildings that the freedmen themselves 
began constructing. Often these structures were located on land 
that the freedmen had purchased for themselves. Additionally, 
in order to obtain financial assistance from the Bureau, school 
organizations were required to ensure that the buildings would 
always be used for educational purposes and that no pupil 
would ever be excluded because of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. By March, 1869, the Bureau had either 
built or had helped to build 630 schoolhouses. It had spent 
$1,771,132.25. In the next three years, its appropriation for 
educational expenses amounted to another $2,000,000.390 
Then in 1867, Representative Thaddeus Stevens introduced the 
Reparations Bill in Congress, but it failed to pass.391 This bill 
stated: 
And be it further enacted. That out of the lands thus seized and 
confiscated the slaves who have been liberated by the 
operations of the war and the amendment to the constitution or 
otherwise, who resided in said “confederate States” on the 4th 
day of March, A.D. 1861, or since, shall have distributed to them 
as follows, namely:  [T]o each male person who is the head of a 
family, forty acres; to each adult male, whether the head of a 
family or not, forty acres, to each widow who is the head of a 
family, forty acres—to be held by them in fee-simple, but to be 
inalienable for the next ten years after they become seized 
thereof.392 
 
 390. Westley, supra note 266, at 461; see Williams, supra note 274, at 445–46 
(“After the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, doors to educational 
opportunities slowly opened for Blacks throughout the South. The Freedmen’s 
Bureau, which Congress established in 1866 to help the newly freed slaves, 
provided the first public schooling for Blacks, as well as for Whites in the South.”). 
 391. See Muhammad, supra note 385, at 155 (noting that even though this 
effort failed, it is considered one of the earliest landmark legal decisions to initiate 
the grant of reparations for past slavery); see also Jeremy Levitt, Black African 
Reparations:  Making a Claim for Enslavement and Systematic De Jure 
Segregation and Racial Discrimination Under American and International Law, 
25 S.U. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1997) (expanding on Stevens’ search for fundamental 
change aimed at dismantling the “Southern plantation system and redistributing 
land to formerly enslaved Blacks”). 
 392. Muhammad, supra note 385, at 155.  
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Congress subsequently rejected calls to enact pension 
legislation for freedmen.393 Adjoa Aiyetoro, co-chair of the 
Reparations Coordinating Committee of the National Coalition of 
Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA), observes that 
Congress’s failure to pass the “Ex-Slave Pension 
legislation . . . supports the conclusion that Congress maintained 
its disdain for and insensitivity to formerly enslaved African 
descendants by denying it owed them a debt due to its support of 
enslavement.”394 Additionally, as Alfred Brophy points out, “as the 
United States struggled with extricating itself from the tragedy of 
slavery in the years of the Civil War and Reconstruction, some 
members of Congress proposed transferring land to former 
slaves.395 The proposals, if followed, would have resulted in huge 
redistribution of property.”396 
Congressman John Conyers introduced H.R. 40 for 
African-American reparations in 1989 but it has not made it to the 
House floor.397 The bill calls for creation of a commission that 
 
 393. See Aiyetoro, supra note 385, at 337 (listing three reasons redress failed 
as the (1) whites in power’s reluctance to acknowledge a debt, (2) whites’ refusal 
to share leadership, and (3) class and perspective divisions within the black 
community). 
 394. See id. at 338 (noting how many previously enslaved individuals failed 
to benefit from pension plans meant for those who served in the Civil War because 
they couldn’t provide documentation of their service). 
 395. See Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in 
Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 498 (2003) (explaining 
the plans were forward thinking and focused on economic independence and 
virtue). 
 396. See id. (“it is doubtful that anyone would be talking about reparations 
now, for there would be no need for them. African Americans would have 
educational opportunities and wealth equivalent to (or approaching) that of the 
white population.”). 
 397. See Aiyetoro, supra note 385, at 343 (explaining that this bill was filed 
every year that Congressman John Conyers was in office); Zachary F. Bookman, 
A Role for Courts In Reparations, 20 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 75, 84 n.54 (2007) (noting 
how shrewd it was for the bill to be named H.R. 40 after the failed attempt by 
General Sherman to provide freed slaves with 40 acres of land.); Commission to 
Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 116th Cong. 
(2019) (highlighting the three goals of the commission to identify “(1) the role of 
the federal and state governments in supporting the institution of slavery, (2) 
forms of discrimination in the public and private sectors against freed slaves and 
their descendants, and (3) lingering negative effects of slavery on living 
African-Americans and society”); Danielson & Pimentel, supra note 377, at 105–
06 (stating the purpose of the Conyers Bill presented to the Judiciary Committee 
in 2001); Maxine Burkett, Reconciliation and Nonrepetition:  A New Paradigm for 
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would study the impact of slavery and ongoing discrimination; and 
make recommendations on reparations through apology and 
monetary payments.398 It also calls for educating the public about 
the damage of slavery.399 In 2000, Congressman Tony Hall 
unsuccessfully introduced his bill in 2000—a bill designed to 
acknowledge the federal government’s contributions to slavery as 
well as issue a formal apology for these contributions.400 
Congressman Conyers persisted by reintroducing his bill every 
year thereafter until he left Congress at which point 
Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee took up the mantle starting 
in 2019 with 125 co-sponsors and a Senate version S.1083 
spearheaded by Senator Cory Booker.401 Under the leadership of 
 
African-American Reparations, 86 OR. L. REV. 99, 127–29 (2007) (noting his status 
as a twenty-five-year veteran of Capitol Hill at the time he first introduced the 
bill). 
 398. See Fortson, supra note 372, at 115 (highlighting a reason that Congress 
has not moved on Congressman Conyers’ repeated attempts to pass this bill 
because the government is only exposed to liability once it has given consent); see 
also Brophy, supra note 395, at 499 (proposing ways to educate Americans about 
the history of slavery on top of making recommendations for reparations). 
 399. See Fortson, supra note 372, at 115 (mentioning other goals of the bill 
such as a formal apology, but at the same time stating these goals as the reason 
the bill won’t go very far).  
 400. See id. (noting the closest the bill comes to reparations was a call for “an 
attempt at real restitution); Yomamata et al., supra note 378, at 72–73 ( “[T]he 
United States dramatically pulled out of the widely publicized 2001 United 
Nations Conference on Contemporary Racism in Durban, South Africa, in fear of 
a resolution naming slavery a crime against humanity.”); Danielson & Pimentel, 
supra note 377, at 109 (stating that the United States government has to approve 
reparations in order to claim credible moral authority internationally).  
 
Just as America implores the world community to recognize human 
rights abuses by ostracizing, punishing and even invading sovereign 
states that refuse to meet America’s standards regarding human 
rights, America should consider its own history on these issues and 
assume the ‘highest responsibility’ in ensuring that those who were 
denied these same rights are justly compensated. Otherwise, just as 
some authors theorize, America may appear as a hypocrite in the 
international community. 
 
For a discussion of the United States’ claims to international moral authority in 
advocacy for reparations, see Joe R. Feagin, Documenting the Costs of Slavery, 
Segregation, and Contemporary Racism:  Why Reparations Are in Order for 
African Americans, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 49, 64–65 (2004). 
 401. See Aiyetoro, supra note 385, at 348 (highlighting how we should stop 
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Chairman Jerrod Nadler, the Judiciary Committee in the House of 
Representatives held a hearing on reparations for slavery on June 
19, 2019.402 The hearing included compelling discussions of slavery 
and its lingering impact on African Americans.403 “To date, more 
than ten cities, including Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Dallas, and 
Washington, D.C., have passed resolutions calling on the federal 
government to inquire into the effects of slavery.”404 Additionally 
eighty percent of the 2020 Democratic presidential frontrunners 
expressed support for reparations signaling the possibility of 
federal action on reparations.405 We agree with Vincent Verdun 
 
believing the process needs to be controlled by the fear of proposal rejections as it 
will only halt the efforts to obtain reparations); see also Valorie E. Douglas, 
Reparations 4.0:  Trading in Older Models for a New Vehicle, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 839, 
874 (2020) (noting that Congressman Conyers Jr. introduced the bill for 25 years); 
see Fortson, supra note 372, at 115 (adding that ten cities have already called on 
the federal government to inquire into the effects of slavery); see Fortson, supra 
note 372, at 116 (“On the other hand, Representative Conyers wrote legislation 
calling for a national holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr. only four days 
after Dr. King was assassinated and the holiday was not established for more 
than fifteen years, so perhaps with persistence Conyers’ reparations efforts will 
also succeed.”). 
 402. H.R. 40 and the Path to Restorative Justice Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2261 
[perma.cc/SB5V-6GEV]. 
 403. See id. (including one story told by Katrina Browne which is now a 
documentary titled Traces of the Trade: A Story from the Deep North and follows 
a family retracing the steps of their ancestors’ triangle trade). 
 404. See Fortson, supra note 372, at 115 (noting that if states were ensured 
they would not be presented with legal liability after an apology, more states may 
take similar action). 
 405.  See Natsu Taylor Saito, Redressing Foundational Wrongs, 51 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 13, 33 (2004). 
 
In reparations discussions, America must remember that African 
Americans “are not ‘victims’ begging for relief from the injustices 
inflicted upon them, but human beings who, individually and in 
community, are insisting that their rights be respected and that the 
perpetrator state comply with the rule of law. They must have the final 
say in what constitutes meaningful and appropriate redress. If this 
process works as it should, they will be empowered by it.  
 
See also Conklin, supra note 371, at 41 (comparing this statistic to the 2016 
Democratic Primary where all three candidates on the ballot expressly rejected 
reparations).  
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that “[g]ranting reparations to Japanese Americans [and other 
groups] without granting similar compensation to African 
Americans sends the latter yet another message declaring that 
they are on the bottom of society’s ladder, and this exclusion 
confirms their sense of futility in the quest for justice in the United 
States.406 Amelioration of one ill has made a previously tolerable 
condition seem degrading.”407 While a broad reparations plan for 
Black Americans is beyond the scope of this article, we outline 
below new legislation and regulatory actions that the federal 
government can take to bring about reparations approaches to 
school finance reform.  
A. Legislation to Remediate Black-White School Funding Gaps 
Congress could provide states with funding to eradicate 
Black-white school funding disparities pursuant to the Spending 
Clause, which provides, “The Congress shall have the Power to lay 
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the Common defense and General Welfare of the 
United States.”408 Congress has enacted several statutes impacting 
 
 406. Vincent Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It:  An Analysis of Reparations to 
African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597, 659 (1993) (explaining that the latter 
message referred to is that “African Americans cannot distinguish their suffering 
from that of Japanese Americans, except to conclude that the injuries suffered by 
African Americans were more severe.”). 
 407. Id. at 659. 
 
The indubitable truth is “[n]o nation can enslave a race of people for 
hundreds of years, set them free bedraggled and penniless, put them, 
without assistance in a hostile environment, against privileged 
victimizers, and then reasonably expect the gap between the heirs of 
the two groups to narrow. Lines, begun parallel and left alone, can 
never touch.” 
 
See President Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Speech at Howard 
University Commencement (June 4, 1965), reprinted in Lee Rainwater & William 
L. Yancey, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 125 (1967) 
(affirming this point through his explanations of racial prejudice); see also Charles 
J. Ogletree, Jr., The Significance of Brown, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 1, 10–12 
(2004) (explaining the resistance to integrate schools after Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 408. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.  
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education through this constitutional provision including the No 
Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) and the Every Student Succeeds 
Act (ESSA).409 In South Dakota v. Dole,410 the Supreme Court laid 
out a four-part test for determining the limits of the federal 
government’s spending power:  (1) The program was in pursuit of 
the general welfare; (2) any condition for accepting the funds is 
unambiguously stated so that states can knowingly choose 
whether to accept the funding; (3) there is a relation between the 
federal interest and the purpose of the federal funding; and (4) the 
spending condition does not violate another constitutional 
provision.411 
In addition to the four-part test, the Court recognized that 
Congress might unconstitutionally coerce states into accepting 
federal funding.412 In Dole, the Court ruled that the Minimum 
Drinking Age Act, which withheld five percent of state funding if 
states failed to raise the drinking age to twenty-one was not 
coercive because states would lose only a small percentage of 
federal funding.413 However, in National Federation of 
Independent Business v Sebelius, (NFIB)414 the Court found that 
the expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act 
constituted illegal coercion.415 Instead of providing states with 
“relatively mild encouragement,” as was the case in Dole, the Court 
 
 409. See Anna Williams Shavers, Using International Human Rights Law in 
School Finance to Establish Education as a Fundamental Right, 27 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 457, 473 (2018) (discussing how Congress uses the General Welfare 
Clause to influence educational policy).  
 410. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (holding that a federal 
statute that withheld federal funds from states whose legal drinking age did not 
conform to federal policy). 
 411. See id. at 207–08 (finding that the fourth limitation occurs when 
Congress is inducing the states to engage “in activities that would themselves be 
unconstitutional”). 
 412. See id. at 211 (stating that the point which would be too far is when 
“pressure turns into compulsion”). 
 413. See id. (noting that states would only lose 5% of funds otherwise 
obtainable under specified highway grant programs). 
 414. See Nat’l Fed. Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (holding 
that the Medicaid expansion portion of the Affordable Care Act violates the 
Constitution).  
 415. See id. at 585 (stating Congress is attempting to “conscript state 
[agencies] into the national bureaucratic army”). 
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likened the choice presented to states in NFIB to “a gun to the 
head.”416  
A federal spending program for states to close Black-white 
school funding gaps caused by state and federal housing policies 
would satisfy the first prong of the Dole test.417 Clearly, such a 
program would be in the interest of the general welfare. Congress 
could satisfy the second prong of the Dole test by clearly indicating 
to states that they must use this funding to eliminate funding 
disparities between Black and white school districts.418 With 
respect to the third prong, Congress could provide findings 
showing how state policies have helped to create the conditions 
leading to Black-white school funding disparities. 
With respect to the final prong, this statute would probably be 
subject to an equal protection challenge.419 As the Supreme Court 
made clear in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña,420 federal 
spending programs that offer financial incentives are subject to 
strict scrutiny if they employ racial classifications.421 To satisfy the 
compelling interest of eliminating past discrimination, Congress 
would have to provide particularized findings of state practices 
that have created Black-white school funding disparities.422 This 
statute could withstand narrow-tailoring analysis because:  
(1) There are no better ways to correct Black-white school funding 
disparities than to provide additional funding to predominantly 
Black school districts; and (2) predominantly white school districts 
 
 416. See id. at 582 (noting that states would lose 10% of their overall budget 
if they do not comply, leaving them with no real option but to acquiesce). 
 417. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (highlighting that in 
considering whether the expenditure is intended to “serve general public 
purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress”). 
 418. See id. (meaning Congress must ensure that states exercise their choice 
“knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation”). 
 419. See id. at 207-08 (explaining that conditions on “federal grants might be 
illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national 
projects or programs.”). 
 420. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding 
that all racial classifications must be analyzed under strict scrutiny).  
 421. See id. at 237 (restating that race-based action may be necessary to 
further a compelling interest, but it must satisfy the compelling interest test and 
the “narrow-tailoring” test). 
 422. See id. at 230 (enacting “racial classifications only when doing so is 
necessary to further a ‘compelling interest’ does not contravene any principle of 
appropriate respect for a coequal branch of the Government”). 
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do not suffer any harm by placing their Black counterparts on an 
equal footing.423 To avoid challenges of coercion, Congress can 
make sure that the program is not so large as to constitute an offer 
that states cannot refuse.424 Also, this proposed program would not 
be connected with any other spending program, so it does not pose 
the danger to which the Court objected in the NFIB case.425 
B. Legislation Providing Additional Funding for School Districts 
Experiencing Black Racial Isolation 
Similarly, we propose that Congress enact legislation 
providing states with additional funding for school districts 
experiencing Black racial isolation.426 Funding pursuant to this 
spending program would be used to mitigate disparities in 
educational outcomes.427 This spending program could also satisfy 
the Dole test.428 It would satisfy the first prong because it would 
combat the outcome inequities experienced by these districts 
caused by state and federal government endorsed and enabled 
housing segregation.429 Congress could satisfy the second prong by 
 
 423. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (listing factors 
which are to be considered in determining whether race-conscious remedies are 
appropriate such as necessity, alternative remedies, the flexibility and duration 
of the relief, and the impact of the relief on third parties). 
 424.  See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (stating that the 
point which would be too far is when “pressure turns into compulsion.”). 
 425.  See Nat’l Fed. Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 558 (2012) (noting 
that the “individual mandate forces individuals into commerce precisely because 
they elected to refrain from commercial activity”). 
 426. See Lauren Camera, Segregation Reinforced by School Districts, U.S. 
NEWS (July 25, 2019, 4:19 P.M.), https://www.usnews.com/news/education-
news/articles/2019-07-25/racial-and-economic-segregation-reinforced-by-school-
district-boundaries (explaining that of the 13 school districts surrounding 
Philadelphia, two-thirds are at least 25% more white and have at “least 10% more 
funding for their schools than the city schools—equating to an average of $5,000 
or more in per-pupil funding”) [perma.cc/Y7E4-FK7B].  
 427. See Baker & Green, supra note 309 at 316 (finding that “just as racial 
achievement gaps persist in education, the cost of closing achievement gaps varies 
across school districts – in part associated with the racial composition of those 
school districts”). 
 428. See supra Part VI, A. Legislation to Remediate Black-White School 
Funding Gaps. 
 429. Id. 
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clearly laying out the conditions for state participation.430 Congress 
could satisfy the third prong by providing particularized findings 
showing how state and federal housing policies have helped to 
create racially isolated Black school districts that need increased 
funding to attain state and federally mandated educational 
outcomes.431 This program could withstand an equal protection 
challenge for the same reasons as the funding program to 
eliminate Black-white school funding disparities.432 Finally, 
Congress must be mindful to design the program so as to not 
constitute coercion. 
C. Department of Education Enforcement Action Pursuant to Title 
VI’s Implementing Regulations 
Finally, the U.S. Department of Education could work with 
states to eliminate Black-white school funding disparities through 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.433 Title VI provides:  “No 
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”434 The Supreme 
Court has held that this provision prohibits only intentional 
discrimination.435 However, the Department of Education has 
promulgated a regulatory provision that prohibits recipients of 
federal funding from engaging in policies that have a disparate 
impact on protected groups: 
A recipient [of federal funds] . . . may not, directly or through 
contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods 
of administration which have the effect of subjecting 
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or 
national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially 
impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as 
 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Id.  
 433. See supra Part VI.A. Legislation to Remediate Black-White School 
Funding Gaps. 
 434. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018). 
 435. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) (“Title VI itself 
directly reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination.”). 
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respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national 
origin.436 
Title VI has authorized the DOE to initiate an investigation of 
a recipient of federal funding “whenever a compliance review, 
report, complaint, or any other information indicates a possible 
failure to comply with this part.”437 If the investigation reveals a 
failure to comply, the regulation provides that “the matter will be 
resolved by informal means whenever possible.”438 If the 
noncompliance cannot be resolved by informal means, the 
regulations authorize the DOE to obtain compliance by suspending 
or terminating federal funding or “by any other means authorized 
by law.”439 Such other means include referring the matter to the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) for enforcement.440  
Thus far, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the enforcement 
wing of the Department, has not used the power granted under the 
Title VI regulations to address state racial funding disparities.441 
However, in two Dear Colleague letters, OCR did recognize this 
problem.442 The first letter, issued in 2001, noted that school 
districts with high concentrations of minority students:  (1) “[W]ere 
less likely to have experienced certified teachers who are teaching 
in their area of expertise”; (2) “were significantly more likely . . . to 
have less adequate environmental conditions across several 
measures, including lighting, heating, ventilation, air quality, 
noise control, energy efficiency, and physical security”; (3) were 
 
 436. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2020). 
 437. 34 C.F.R. §§ 107(a), (c) (2020). 
 438. Id. § 107(d)(1). 
 439. 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a)(8). 
 440. See id. (“No action to effect compliance by any other means authorized 
by law shall be taken until (1) the responsible Department official has determined 
that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means, (2) the recipient or other 
person has been notified of its failure to comply and of the action to be taken to 
effect compliance, and (3) the expiration of at least 10 days from the mailing of 
such notice to the recipient or other person.”). 
 441. See S. Hsin, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45665, CIVIL RIGHTS AT SCHOOL: 
AGENCY ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 17 (2019) 
(explaining how the Office of Civil Rights enforces Title VI regulations). 
 442. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, “Dear Colleague” Letter, 
at 2 (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
resourcecomp-201410.pdf (recognizing the department’s Title VI power) 
[perma.cc/NJB4-XRRR]. 
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“less likely to have access to . . . computers”; and (4) received less 
funding per pupil than their low-minority counterparts.443 The 
letter concluded by “strongly encourag[ing] all states to examine 
their provision of educational resources.”444  
The second letter, issued in 2014, addressed the problem of 
unequal access to educational resources experienced by school 
districts serving students of color.445 Specifically, the letter pointed 
out that districts serving such students were at a disadvantage to 
their predominantly white districts with respect to:  (1) Advanced 
courses and gifted and talented programs; (2) experienced 
teachers; (3) facilities; and (4) access to instructional materials and 
technology.446 The letter observed that districts needed adequate 
funding to provide the resources to provide the resources listed 
above, but districts serving students of color often lacked such 
funding because of “funding systems that allocate less State and 
local funds to high-poverty schools that frequently have more 
students of color.”447 The letter asserted that school districts could 
violate Title VI by adopting facially neutral funding policies that 
had a racially disparate impact.448 OCR laid out a three-step 
process for making this determination:  (1) Whether the school 
district had a facially neutral policy that created an adverse racial 
impact; (2) whether the school district could demonstrate an 
important educational goal for the policy; and (3) whether there 
are alternative policies that could accomplish the district’s goal 
with less discriminatory effect on an affected racial group.449 
Although the letter focused on the resource allocations of school 
districts, the OCR observed that states also had to “comply with 
Title VI’s nondiscrimination requirements, including 
nondiscrimination in their provision and allocation of education 
resources.”450 Therefore, OCR: 
[S]trongly encourages State education officials and school 
 
 443. Id.  
 444. Id. at 4.  
 445. Id.  
 446. Id. at 3–5.  
 447. Id. at 5. 
 448. Id. at 7.  
 449. Id. at 8.  
 450. Id. at 1 n.†.  
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administrators to closely review this letter and to take proactive 
steps to ensure that the educational resources they provide are 
distributed in a manner that does not discriminate against 
students on the basis of race, color, or national origin. In 
particular, State education officials should examine policies and 
practices for resource allocation among districts to ensure that 
differences among districts do not have the unjustified effect of 
discriminating on the basis of race.451 
In turn, we strongly urge OCR to investigate racial funding 
disparities at the state level, using the investigatory mechanism 
laid out in the Dear Colleague Letter to help states redress the 
policies that are creating Black-white school funding disparities.  
VIII. Conclusion 
This article has addressed why and how school finance reform 
should be a part of a reparations program for Black Americans. 
Black-white school funding disparities have endured from the 
separate-but-equal era to the present day despite more than 
sixty-five years of school desegregation and school finance 
litigation. State and federal governmental housing policies, state 
school funding formulas, and Supreme Court decisions have helped 
to create these Black-white school funding gaps. Consequently, 
many predominantly Black school districts are racially isolated, 
thus needing more resources than predominantly white schools to 
attain the same educational outcomes. Furthermore, Black 
taxpayers suffer harm because they have to pay more taxes than 
their white counterparts to fund education. 
Because litigation has proven inadequate to achieve 
reparations for school finance reform, we have set out a legislative 
plan that state and federal governments could adopt. Our four-part 
plan for state legislation calls for:  (1) Compensation to school 
districts caused by unequal taxation; (2) rebates to Black property 
taxpayers covering Black-white differentials in residential 
taxation; (3) redistribution of school finance and aid distributions 
based on systemic racism; and (4) increased funding to Black 
school districts that are experiencing racial isolation. Our plan for 
federal action calls for legislation providing funding to remediate 
 
 451. Id.  
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Black-white school funding gaps and additional funding to school 
districts experiencing Black racial isolation. In addition, the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) should 
work with states pursuant to Title VI’s implementing regulations 
to remedy the effects of funding policies that have an adverse 
disparate impact on predominantly Black school districts. 
